Hope you get an answer to this question and that it inspires a discussion. I’ve given it a fair amount of thought over the years.
I personally believe singlesig with a strong paraphrase is the way to go. The simplest solution that provides the security you need is always best.
So then the question becomes: What additional security does the multisig complexity provide to an individual owner?
A lot of multisig users hand over one or more of their signing keys to a centralized third party. So now you’ve just advertised to any interested party that you own Bitcoin. And deep down, you probably have to accept the fact that eventually that centralized pot of signing keys will be compromised, either by an insider, the government, or some external party.
You could give the additional key(s) to a spouse or loved one and hope their greed doesn’t compel them to steal from you. What’re the odds? 50/50? 75/25? Who knows?
You also have to find a secure place to store the additional key(s). So now what? You can’t store them all in the same place. That would defeat the purpose. Each additional hiding place increases the odds that at least one of the keys gets stolen or compromised. Sure, you can try to set up a “3 of 5” multisig solution but that just increases the complexity to ridiculous levels for an individual. Remember, it’s up to you as a forgetful human being to remember where all of your keys are. Much easier done with single than multi.
When I weighed all the pros and cons, I concluded singlesig gives the most bang for your buck. Multisig is great for business funds where each partner needs to sign off, but for an individual? Singlesig all the way.
You gave the answer already
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I appreciate the thoughtful response!
The pros of a self made 2/3 multivendor multisig (not using a 3rd party custodian) that matter, imo, are:
1) One malicious firmware update can't rug you
2) Bad entropy for seed generation
3) Supply chain attack for the HWW you use in singlesig
4) Some geographical distribution that could thwart/delay a $5 wrench attack
Now that of course comes with tradeoffs of complexity, possible footguns, higher transaction costs, etc...
While I love the idea of keeping it as simple as possible, the thought that some rogue employee could have manipulated one coldcard before it shipped and that could drain one's life savings with absolutely no recourse is quite a scary thought.
The addition of passphrase to singlesig does mitigate some of these problems, but only if you are verifying that the device is indeed 'using' the passphrase.
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