He's correct, nostr doesn't fix CEOs getting arrested. But his point is also moot because targeting CEOs of nostr apps, even of big ones, will never have the disruptive return for governments that the arrest of a centralized platform's CEO has, mostly because switching costs are close to zero for nostr users, while there is no switching option for telegram users.
For those of you who are still on Twitter, I had a long debate thread today with Parker Lewis about Nostr. I'm a big fan of Parker, so I figured I'd share it here for shared learning.
Here's the latest post. I'm not sure it'll be the last or not but it's the latest one as of this writing. You can scroll up to see the exchange from the start.
https://x.com/LynAldenContact/status/1828553130717442443
Linking to my own post in isolation is bad form and the thumbnail is awkward depending on what client you're using, so I'll also provide a pic of the start of the debate too, with two posts of his and one of mine.
I'd be open to any thoughts about this debate.
Discussion
he's not correct because arresting nostr app CEOs is irrelevant. The value is in the nostr network and governments will not go after the app CEOs because you can plug in another app and reduce the efforts of governments to garbage. So governments will not even attempt going after a CEO of some app with 50,000 users.
I just don't understand your point and also Parker Lewis clearly doesn't understand the value proposition of nostr.
I think we mainly agree. Nostr CEOs are lower value targets compared to platform CEOs. But govs could still come after them for ✨️ reasons.
It's silly to expect a protocol to fix arbitrary arrests.
The greatest threat vector to nostr is to allow social-selling to make the base-implementation protocol too complex for a new dev to quickly spin up a basic social app. I believe the protocol architecture, clear goals and the NIP system mitigates but doesen't eliminate the possibility.