If your UTXO was created from a KYC purchase, your identity will be flagged as "a coinjoiner" once your funds become private regardless of whether or not you use WabiSabi or Whirlpool coinjoins to make them private.
In the case of chain surveillance firms, coordinators are purchasers of their data, not suppliers of their data. If a coin attempted to register, but is rejected due to a blacklist, that does inform the coordinator that the blacklisted user attempted to make their coin private, but it does not inform the coordinator anything about the IP address or other coins in their wallet; One input could fail to register for coinjoin while the others succeed.
No toxic change is definitely the main benefit. Any change created by postmix spends is able to be recoinjoined for free as well in Wasabi, so you only ever pay the coordinator for privacy a maximum of one time, not every time you spend.
As for attackers remixing, the economics of Whirlpool is designed so that mining fees for all 5 participants are paid by the new participants. This makes it cheap to stay in the pool and costly to enter/exit it. This places legitimate users at a cost disadvantage to the spies, since the spies never intend to exit the pool.
Feel free to ask any questions about either implementation, I can provide you examples of coinjoins on the blockchain and walk you through the differences between them.
How is it "senseless" to prefer all amounts be made private with no traceable links? Like I said, feel free to post any Whirlpool tx and I will identify the new entrants' change with 100% accuracy.
I do understand doxic change which is why I recommend the Samourai coordinator upgrades their protocol from Whirlpool to stop creating these deterministic links at all.
I understand it perfectly which is why I was able to reveal the deterministic links between the Whirlpooled input and the tx0 change. Whirlpool is simply not private.
Go ahead, post any Whirlpool tx here and I'll identify the change of the new entrants 100% of the time with 100% accuracy.
Okay then, forget about Wasabi and just focus on the Whirlpool transaction I ummixed. Do you think it's fair for Samourai to charge their users for coordinating coinjoins that leave behind deterministic links?
Wasabi has the best solution since you can't unmix the coinjoins to reveal the change. I just unmixed this Whirlpool transaction: #[7]
You don't seem to understand. Whirlpool transactions can easily be unmixed to reveal the traceable change. Here's where I tracked the change from the Whirlpool entrants:
bc1qwdunzeuh7csqgj7eemz87udqpnjmzaugaa5gvj has 0.00013365 BTC in change that belongs to bc1qapz2y95uvmcp64z9edsp44x35dqrgeq3rnytud which is the third input in the whirlpool tx. This is completely revealed by the tx0 that created it: b787184c44e482d0ca56562a6f01bd78b35a3471783d03c8db4bb3894e9f6d89
bc1qa58fvu80y6k2ana8f0893uuqqc0zm97nmuzezn has 0.11149586 in change that belongs to bc1q3dyxkm2dcf8jh6rl9z272vduwzutz225v5a8hd which is the fourth input in the whirlpool tx. This is completely revealed by the tx0 that created it: f1b351e3741fbe76ccd6420f5af070a6654de2d5494b05b6b05ede88f227604f
If Samourai has the best team, why haven't they upgraded from Whirlpool coinjoins to WabiSabi coinjoins yet?
Correct, the coordinator fee does nothing to prevent against a malicious coordinator since they would just paying themselves.
However, even third parties are still able to sybil attack Whirlpool for no marginal cost even with the coordinator fee. The coordinator fee just slightly increases their up front cost to attack, while the continuous cost of attack remains zero.
Wasabi coinjoins fix this free sybil attack by requiring attackers to pay for their own mining fees instead of forcing victims to pay for the mining fees of their attackers.
What do you mean? Coordinator fees are not a part of a coinjoin's security model at all. They are a completely optional revenue stream.
The major difference between whirlpool and wasabi is that wasabi is not zerolink and whirlpool is 100% entropy, so many of the issues with wasabi's mix composition do not apply to whirlpool.
Wasabi made little effort to stop a user from spending the unmixed change with their mixed outputs. In fact it encouraged this with a "select all" button that spends the entirety of the wallet balance, mixed and unmixed in the same tx, which undoes all the mixing. Unmixed change can also reduce user anonymity sets (toxic recall attack) and de-anonymize users without any user feedback.
Dealing with the different mixed TXO amounts is a nightmare, which is why wasabi purposefully made their coin selection deterministic (predictable), which negates the effects of remixing.
Wasabi also has an address reuse problem. Which comes in various flavors, my favorite of which is the kind where a mixed TXO and unmixed TXO are paid to the same address, which automatically de-anonymizes the user. See YouTube video for explainer.
https://youtube.com/watch?v=alcLdBsoDDg
De-anonymizing users with the above issues does not require "compromised XPUBs", which seems to be the only gripe by The Kliq against Samourai.
Whirlpool, being 100% entropy, does not have the problems discussed above.
There is no unmixed change in WabiSabi coinjoins, while there is traceable change left behind from Whirlpool tx0 transactions.
WabiSabi: mempool.space/tx/01a1a055719129397fb8344b5a09e6cfe72868c8e1d750e621d8b580c96bf77b
Whirlpool: mempool.space/tx/1825e9f7f0548fb4957d389b20e0e46d1ccc9ee50a75ebd19f7a49cdee761e50
If you are a customer of any of these services, please shame them until they support sending to taproot addresses.
I disagree, there's a problem Sparrow doesn't solve, which is losing your privacy from consolidating UTXOs.
Wasabi Wallet solves the problem of consolidating inputs privately since your inputs can be consolidated within a coinjoin, preventing observers from using the common input ownership heuristic to trace that they belong to the same person.
No, I do understand your graphic: It shows Samourai charges fees for the 0.01 and 0.001 pools.
zkSNACKS chooses not charge their users to make amounts these small private.
Your own graphic shows that Samourai charges coordinator fees even for amounts 0.01 and lower. Is your own graphic "bullshit"?
"Not so extreme" fees still sounds like more than "zero fees". I don't think you're going to convince people to waste their sats on this.
😉Yep that's me. I'm the guy who tells people how to make their Bitcoins very private for very cheap. What's your point?
I just explained to you exactly how Samourai's Whirlpool is deliberately designed to make reduce the marginal cost to sybil attack rounds to zero: After a one time payment, attackers are able to stay in the pool and able to spy on additional rounds. The block space the spy uses is paid for by the victims of the spying , and there's no way for the victims to even identify this is happening to them.
Wasabi fixes this sybil attack vector since the attacker must ALWAYS pay for their block space, preventing them from passively surveil users in the pool for free. Much larger round sizes (150 input minimum instead of 5 maximum) make sybil attacks against Wasabi's coinjoins even more costly for attackers.
You are correct: The pool fee is for FUNDING SAMOURAI, not for preventing sybul attacks - It is completely optional, Samourai can coordinate coinjoins for free if they chose to. Coordinator fees obviously do nothing to prevent sybil attacks by a malicious coordinator because they pay the fee to themselves.
zkSNACKS does not charge coordinator fees for remixes, but the free bonuses don't stop there! Unlike Samourai's coordinator, zkSNACKS' coordinator ALSO generously offers free coinjoins for inputs less than 1 million sats and ALSO doesn't charge any coordinator fees for change mixes once you do any post mix spending. Samourai cares more about making money than giving their users privacy, which is why they charge so much more in coordinator fees than zkSNACKS does.
tx0 is designed to FACILITATE sybil attacks, not PREVENT them. An up front cost does nothing stop a sybil attacker, a continuous cost stops a sybil attacker. By removing the continuous cost, you give the attacker the economic advantage over the users being spied on.
I'm happy to answer any questions you might have about all of the privacy improvements that were made from upgrading from Zerolink to WabiSabi.
Mining fees prevent sybil attacks, coordinator fees do not.
Samourai's implementation subsidizes sybil attackers by having the attacker's mining fees paid for by the atrack victims, allowing the attacker to participate in deanonymization for completely free.