The Ultimate Goal for Saving in #BTC should be 1 Billion Satoshis.
0.1 #BTC = 10M Sats.
1 #BTC = 100M Sats.
10 #BTC = 1B Sats.
Respect is a two way street:
- Reject “Cis”
- Embrace “Super-Straight”
Don’t expect anyone to respect your preferred gender pronouns if you don’t respect their preferred labels like “Super-Straight.”
🇷🇺INSURGENCY IN RUSSIA: what we can be sure of so far.
The impression of Russian weakness from the beginning of its war against Ukraine has always been passionately denied by its propagandists. Today it was proved that the insistent nuclear bluff was an almost unique weapon to demonstrate strength.
Putin reportedly had to resort to the rescue of the man he used as a puppet: Aleksandr Lukashenko. This helped Putin by knowing that his communist regime, inheritance of the Soviet Union, is still standing, solely and exclusively thanks to subservience to Putin's regime. It was the embrace of the desperate.
What was wide open to the world at this moment:
1. Putin is no longer the owner of internal power.
2. Putin does not have the hegemony of the armed forces.
3. Russia lacks the ability to protect its own territory in a “surprise assault”.
4. He Set a bad example for Russian culture by abandoning the capital (which seems to be a fact).
5. The partners of the CSTO (Russian version of NATO), were not available to help him, mainly President Tokayev of Kazakhstan.
6. Putin must hand over heads of his high ranks to try to stay in power, without the possibility of making threats or distributing his famous tea.
7. Putin, if nothing changes, must become a puppet of the Russian oligarchy, who will use his image to carry out his wishes.
8. The role of the Wagner Group should change the power structure mainly in Africa, if that's what Prigozhin wants.
Points we need to pay attention to:
a) How will this dynamic affect the relationship with China and how will the Communists of Beijing take advantage of it?
b) How will this weakening influence the dynamics of relations with Iran in Latin America?
c) How will this process influence the actions of the São Paulo Forum in Latin America?
d) Would the “globalist” elite have acted to, once again, come to Putin's aid? (If you don't know this point and think it's funny, it's time to review everything you know about international relations in the last 20 years).
There are many questions, many things that will happen from now on. Russian dynamics have started to change dramatically and the main questions are:
- Will Putin be able to “turn around”?
- In a new power arrangement, what will be the new position of the Russian oligarchic structure?
The next few months will be intense and full of deep studies.
🚨Russia 🇷🇺: Putin thanked President of Belarus Lukashenko “The President of Belarus informed the President of Russia in detail about the results of negotiations with the leadership of PMC Wagner.
The President of Russia supported and thanked his Belarusian counterpart for the work done,” according to the press service of Alexander Lukashenko.
🚨 Prigozhin released a recording that he will turn his columns around and stop his March of Justice on Moscow after coming within 200km. There's going to be so much more to this. Either a fake out or some insane deal has been struck, and not necessarily with Putin. 🍿
🚨Russia 🇷🇺: Belarusian President Lukashenko, after talking to Putin, has been talking to Prigozhin
Prigozhin accepted Lukashenko's proposal to stop the advance towards Moscow and open a channel of negotiations with the Kremlin.
#Bitcoin is the supreme collateral for:
1) being the first and most relevant asset that can be publicly proven control, without cost or intermediaries, with message signature;
2) address balances can also be consulted by anyone, at no relevant cost, proving unfaithful deposit in case of breach of contract;
3) smart contracts are possible with balance movement conditions/terms, such as timelock;
4) collective control of addresses being possible by arrangements such as “Shamir secret sharing scheme” or multisig - enabling collective control by consensus (3 of 3, 5 of 5) or automated election of arbitrators (2 of 3, 3 of 5 or 5 of 7);
5) by bitcoin's immunity to capital controls, expropriation and dilution properties.
A private contract to regenerate corrupted universities
How the market can solve the financing of higher education when the 92% of state resources that fund it disappear, still resolving the social security issue.
Abstract: The following text is a draft (corrections and suggestions are welcome), an outline of ideas and references on how income share agreements - ISA can be a solution (with or without government support) for the problem of student funding, the collapse of social security and the regeneration of universities corrupted into dens of militancy by excess of influence and public money. The contract consists of an investor (educational institution, relative or party with greater access, control and information about the student) paying for the debtor's education in exchange for a percentage of his/her income for a specified period - with the possibility of losing wealth or multiplying investment, improving control mechanisms ( convenants) and selection. The execution of this contract can be made possible by the government (legal framework giving legal certainty to its execution) or by means of private judgment and execution with escrow (fiduciary guarantor), arbitrator and guarantor in multsig. The data used is mostly North American, but the same problems and solutions are observed all over the world, to different degrees.
1. Premises/Introduction:
Freedom is the greatest resource that exists and all corruption comes from the dissociation of control and property, this has already been mentioned and referenced in other texts and will be demonstrated below.
People respond to motivations, most people tend to follow dominant behavior - the one that is most worthwhile. If the majority does not follow a higher cost/benefit behavior, it will cease to be the majority due to natural selection: if a bastard has no right to anything, there is no point in giving a married man a blow to the stomach; if there is no imposition of paternity by DNA, there is no motivation for sperm theft. If you don't agree or understand this, don't continue, you'll just get bored.
In this way, as is observed in reality and is widely demonstrated in Institutional Economics, natural resources do not guarantee development to countries or regions - as explained in the "Dutch disease"1. Development is correlated to motivations: where it pays to be honest, the the majority tend to behave cooperatively, creating and accumulating wealth; where it pays to be opportunistic, the majority tends to behave as an opportunist and whoever accumulates or produces something that depends on the custody or protection of others ends up losing.
2. Context/Problems:
In the USA alone, student debt has already exceeded 1.7 trillion dollars2 (more than Brazil's GDP in 2021). The left itself recognizes that the main campaign promise that elected Biden was to cancel the student debts3 of 13% of the population (43 million debtors) - ignoring the wide distribution of tens of millions of unsolicited mail-in envelopes, exploding the purchase of votes4. Bolsonaro did what Biden promised: he forgave up to 93% of the debt of the FIES deadbeats, once again, stimulating opportunism5 - although in Brazil there were less than 1 million beneficiaries and with values orders of magnitude smaller than the debts of the Americans.
In addition to negative interest rates inflating the value of assets and administrative capture (regulations to enrich those with political access benefiting large corporations), student debt is considered one of the great destructive factors of the American middle class6, both for preventing inheritance (since most of the creditors are unable to pay the debt) and because it makes entry and permanence in universities more expensive7 (since the wide supply of credit caused an explosion in the cost of education in the country, almost tripling since 1971, even corrected for inflation8).
As those who finance the courses have guaranteed payment, they have no motivation to control the quality of the students or the course. As universities receive their payments regardless of the result, they also do not suffer any pressure for quality control and much less cost9.
The students and their families, even worse, are the least informed about the relationship and the ones who have the greatest cost in assuming the risk of the undertaking (since they have less information and less possibility of diversification), usually emotionally deciding whether to study (and where) based on on the (at least) biased assessments of the university and funder that approved them. That is why universities were degenerated into dens of political militancy, since most of the wealth10 obtained by them depends today on educationalist political militancy11 and not on the supposed "educational services" and much less on their capacity to increase productivity or capacity to generate income. Wealth of its students If the government pays more than 90% of tuition, it is the main customer to be satisfied.
In this way, useless courses (uselees majors) become viable that do not qualify for any productive activity and that their graduates, as a rule, will go into even more debt to do masters and doctorates - or will work in activities not related to graduation, usually with a loss of comparative value to if they had never set foot in college - Cuba12 is the extreme case of graduates, masters and doctors who are drivers, prostitutes, cooks and waiters, but even in the USA it is not uncommon for graduates to baristas, Starbucks or McDonalds clerks - reaching 48% of Uber13 drivers in the US.
For most students the current system reduces their wealth and income. Certain (and rare) degrees have a present value of more than 1 million US$14. However, the average ROI - average return on investment (marginal income gain due to the acquisition of the degree brought to present value - NPV) among 30,000 courses in the US is 129,000US$. Thus, in the vast majority of cases, the student does not have an average gain in relation to the opportunity cost since: 1) the average income in the USA is more than 30,000 US$ per year (and those who attend college delay years in starting their career losing 4 years of work, usually at peak productivity and health); 2) there is a risk of becoming one of the 40% of dropouts (who do not graduate without obtaining any investment benefit); and, 3) there is also opportunity cost in gaining experience, capitalization, real education in working full time instead of dedicating years to formal education and restricted opportunities after graduation, such as military service. This with current data, with negative real interest and highly subsidized rates, with normalization of interest tends to get worse.
Below is a description - in its main benefits and motivations - of a contract that can combine the interests of universities, student debtors and investors, resolving the three issues: 1) how to guarantee pension systems (given that pay-as-you-go systems collapse with insufficient fertility and capitalization collapse with systematic negative interest); 2) how to make available private resources in abundance and market correction mechanisms for student financing (of courses and students who really have the potential to have a return on investment); and, 3) how to remove distortions derived from undue regulations, realigning motivations mitigating corruption and opportunism.
3. Hypothesis/Solution:
As is the rule among regulatory problems, the solution begins with the removal of distortions created by state actions15 and ends with the alignment of interests with cooperative motivations.
In this case, there is a contract that, if its performance is guaranteed, can offer a private solution for student financing, also resolving the infeasibility of social security: these are voluntary income share agreements16. In Brazil, for vocational courses17, this contract already exists in a modality in which the educational institution finances the course and the student pays proportionally to his income and if he does not have a relevant income for 60 months, he does not pay anything.
The investor assumes risk and aligns his motivations: in making the correct selection of students and courses with return potential and in maximizing the debtor's income (which is a "partner"). The debtor is also duly motivated in choosing viable courses and of demonstrate and develop the necessary skills to pass and take advantage of such courses.Investors commit to financing the costs and students commit to paying a percentage of their eventual income for years - not having any debt after the contracted period.
Students are usually the least qualified to assess their ability to generate value by enrolling in a course or program - either because of their age, inexperience in the market or inability to carry out a comparative self-assessment. Investors with lower allocation risk (with more information, possibility of diversification and control) who would have, with lower cost and risk, to control attributes and compatibility between student and course - enriching if they were right and impoverishing if they were wrong, being corrected the criteria adopted by market mechanisms.
Take, for example, an uncle who was willing to finance a nephew's medical school for 10% of his eventual income for 30 years after the completion of their residencies:
Would a veteran uncle in the area be more or less able to assess his nephew's income potential in relation to governments and banks? if the uncle believed that the nephew lacks the mental skills and attributes to become a productive professional, would he have motivations to take out this contract? If the uncle financed a student every 6 years consolidating a marginal income of 10% pa for 30 years and it cost less than 20% of his own income, if he selected and controlled (including through covenants18) the debtors well, the income would not support indefinitely new financing after the second borrower starts paying - and a sustainable income after the 3rd?
Trade is exchange that creates value, voluntary private contracts increase the wealth of both parties. If the loan has no prospect of producing an increase in wealth for the financier, would he accept this contract? If the loan is not expected to produce more than a 10% increase in the student's future income, would he accept this contract?
Once the contract is successfully fulfilled: the student has doubled or tripled his future income and supplemented the investor's income for 30 years (paying 10% of the debtor's income in the period) that financed 5 or 6 years of his studies, there was motivation of one party to be opportunistic with the other? Which? Wouldn't this be mitigated if the debtor's eventual estate/inheritance were collateral lost in the event of fraud or default?
If the answers to the previous questions are consistent with the Theory of Rational Choices or praxeology, then the generation of value and the superiority of these contracts in relation to any other in which the financier does not have "skin at risk" is demonstrated.
This type of contract aligns the motivations: the financer has a permanent motivation to increase the debtor's income, during the payment period, with financial contributions - such as offering successive contracts for other courses that increase productivity and employability even more) - and not financial - such as getting indications of employment/entrepreneurship, personally guiding or even controlling the debtor through covenants to avoid diseases (such as chemical dependency, obesity and other pathologies) or loss of productivity/health due to bad habits.
In summary:
Would you rather pay 1 #btc for your child's higher education or give 1 btc in multisig as a guarantee for someone in the area (who can guide, control and find a job) to pay for 10% of the income for 30 years after graduation?
Do you prefer that the funders (and consequently customers) of higher education are: a) entrepreneurs aiming to increase the productivity and income of graduates; or, b) governments looking to buy votes, militants and dependency - all maximized if students are failed losers?
If you have a company in any sector and have a godchild, nephew or associate with potential, what do you gain financially by paying for his college without ISA? Now, to keep 10% of his salary for 30 years would not be worth paying for college and courses - in addition to guiding the student and demanding health and life insurance covenants, monitoring, toxicology, exercise, diet and even nootropics depending on the case?
4. Covenants:
A common question to present this type of contract is: what if the debtor, after taking advantage of years of financing, does not pay? how to control your real income?
The control of real income is already usually faced by tax agencies around the world, but in the case of a private contract, the creditor has even more conditions of control of the debtor, either through trust (if he is a person close to the debtor), or by surety (lost in case of non-compliance), or through accessory obligations: the creditor can limit the movement and activities of the debtor until the execution of the contract, can monitor its location, audio and video environments - or require its presence in a predetermined place some hours per day; may require your income statements and access to your accounts or even submitting examinations or carrying out medical treatments (such as toxicology and use of nootropics) or life and disability insurance.
Convenant can also determine under what conditions the debtor can work - reducing the chance of income concealment. If someone finances a student to graduate in Law in Brazil, it is natural that the contract requires that the debtor should limit himself to taking public exams until he passes (avoiding the chance of unreported income).
Now, if the debtor has a partner in the creditor who has every interest in increasing his income - with financial and non-financial contributions - the risk of acting as an opportunist in a contract with him also represents a risk of financial loss (guarantee without state backing and equity and future income in case of state support).
5. Function and justification of the ISA:
If the family has assets to be a guarantor, why not pay for education right away instead of serving as a guarantor? As already explained, contracts are more efficient when the actors have the lowest risk-taking cost - least cost bearer (with more diversification, information and control capacity). In addition, the risk profile of those who yield (income) and increase in equity is diverse.
If the father finances the child's education, he does not have any marginal financial gain (since the children already have maintenance obligations with him, financing his higher education or not) and amplifies the scale of the loss if the son fails in the undertaking. Just by being a guarantor, you reduce risk (keeping your assets if the debtor does not violate the contract, even a failed child) increasing the child's return potential (including a professional part in monitoring, financing and guiding).
With this contract popularized, recruiting, funding and mentoring potential students would become an income-consolidating market (as are bonds, real estate and stocks that have global market values in the hundreds of trillions of US$19) - and investors would have broad motivations to "mine" opportunities, making available a virtually unlimited amount of private resources for education, with market control.
Summary, recommendations and conclusions:
Future income sharing contracts consist of instruments in which the debtor has education financed by the creditor by promising a percentage of his future income for a specified period - as in the example cited 10% for 30 years, but it could also be 5% for 60 years or 15% for 25 years - depending on the negotiation.
By legalizing and guaranteeing the execution of contracts for the division of eventual rents, "inter generational solidarity" can be guaranteed, solving the problems of student financing and social security collapse - also solving many other problems, such as the waste of public resources in courses that do not generate any value, the explosion in education costs (derived from the subsidized offer of credits without quality control of courses or students); and, the instrumentalization of universities in dens of educational militancy, since in the current model most of their income comes from administrative capture instead of actual wealth creation.
The solution to student debt is the guarantee of contracts with economic balance - which is only possible with alignment of interests so that cooperative behaviors are dominant. Without state subsidies and guarantees, large corporations and banks would have no advantage in offering these contracts over relatives, neighbors, professors or the university itself - with idiosyncratic advantages in selecting and controlling students.
The solution to the capitalization problem, in the long run, may be the normalization of fertility (with the dismantling of misandry and welfare laws), but in the long term it is the offer of returns above fixed interest rates (as in the natural returns in markets kept out of legacy).
A contact like this could be guaranteed and made possible by state rules and courts or by the indication in the contract of guarantor, arbitrator and escrow that maintain guarantees of fulfillment of the debtor's obligations in multisig20 (3 of 5 or 4 of 7), in bitcoin (or synthetics collateralized into bitcoin), the ultimate collateral.
The advantages of a parent being a guarantor of such a contract instead of a financier are: first, that it makes an investor more directly interested in increasing their child's eventual income and in assessing their potential (increasing their chance of success and non-financial investment in their offspring); second, that it reduces risk, since if your child does not have relevant income after graduation, he at least keeps the bail deposit if he does not breach the obligation, sharing the cost of a failed child.
When the main funding of universities is derived from the percentage of income of their graduates - and not from government subsidies - then they will have motivation to focus on education that increases value and productivity of students instead of focusing on administrative capture and on training militancy educationalist, even more effective if graduates fail in private markets. These contracts can also serve as market signals for which courses there is a demand for an increase in vacancies and which courses should be closed.
As it is clear in the examples of socialist and Soviet countries that legions of formal masters and doctors with diplomas without real value live on menial activities - or remain unproductive and economically inactive for most of their lives, academic degrees are not synonymous with real education and much less productivity gain or ability to generate wealth. So, based on the exposed data, the recommendations are:
For most people, attending college represents a financial loss, as shown in numbers in references, considering opportunity costs, even in US$ and with negative real interest.
The number of people with the vocation and attributes to gain productivity and value with formal higher education is very small and efforts to democratize its access only demoralize such courses and programs, destroying their value.
The student and his family are usually the least qualified parties to decide whether to study and where - because they have less access to information about courses, comparative attributes and ability to diversify, in addition to deciding emotionally. This is solved by adopting the simple criterion of “if a rational private third party is not willing to finance your course/program, you shouldn't be there, you don't have market demand or personal capacity”. .
Proxies (indicators) of education (higher or literacy) are consequences of wealth and not causes, as Cuba and other socialist and Soviet countries prove.
The next text will deal with how the collapse of the social welfare system (welfare), the end of social security systems (public and private with the collapse of the legacy) and the migration of income and assets to the clouds (making judicial executions unfeasible) creates demand for dowry marriage contracts (comparing Indian, Islamic and Western models) as a mechanism to guarantee food for the spouse and offspring - even more effective than current pensions or past solutions, given the new technological possibilities.
Abstract: Responding to requests, the following text answers the three questions proposed by Alan Schramm in relation to MAM - Death Betting Markets. Without defense or moral judgment, only possible technical solutions to the three issues raised are discussed: the escrow, the identifier and the oracle.
1. Introduction
After the collapse of FTX, it can no longer be denied that the world's major power groups have their devices and representatives in the Bitcoin ecosystem, sometimes collaborating and sometimes conflicting - as was evident in the battle of the “war of wars”1
The literature review on the subject can already be found in the previous article in the same substack2 addressing the legality of life insurance made on the deaths of politicians; the exact analogy of death gamble motivations with insurance; plausibility of legal use of the system, since death can be natural, it would not necessarily be a market for assassins; and, the history of publications on capture/kill markets.
MAM awakens growing public interest and the main issues of this market were well described by Alan in this episode of intankaveis3: "decentralized identifier, decentralized oracle and escrow".
2. Model
All corruption stems from the separation of control and ownership. With modern governments this issue has reached its apex, with elected politicians and even unelected bureaucrats causing harm to millions or billions of people with absolutely impunity.
The death betting market would be a way to realign power and responsibility. By allowing victims to invest small amounts betting on the death of their tormentors, it would solve Olson's “collective action problem” - which explains why criminals tend to administratively capture governments (centralized benefits and diffused losses). MAM also makes crimes, abject non-criminal behavior and even mere corruption by administrative capture unfeasible/expensive, increasing the risk of becoming the target of significant stakes.
In other words, dictators and criminals in public office inflict losses on millions of people - or billions - but not large enough for one of them to retaliate. With MAM, the collective organization will be independent of negotiation or other communication beyond the platform or smart contract - and even other people who are not the victims will be interested in investing in the bets - such as: a) hitmen, in order to win the bet; b) player, as an alternative to state lotteries (usually fraudulent and with tax costs, in many cases, of more than 50% of the prize); and, up to c) the target itself, in search of a safe conduct.
Would a million people bet, on average, $1000 on the day that a dictator will die?
If the answer is yes, then $1 billion could be pseudo-anonymously raised for anyone who bets on the day of death correctly. For an amount of this magnitude, probably even relatives and closest employees would be willing to guarantee death on a certain day - especially if the destination and ownership of the payment were not public.
In the previous article, gamification mechanisms were discussed to make this happen more efficiently: exclusive bets per day (avoiding the risk of splitting the prize), bets and payments through pseudo-anonymous means; and, increasing betting costs (perfect discrimination), as explained in the excerpt:
“To give you an idea of the values that could occur, if each exclusive one-day bet costs 1 US$ more than the previous one and the first one costs 1 US$, considering only a 50-year window (18,262 days) - which ignores the participants ideological players with no intention of receiving anything and thus being able to bet more than 50 years in the future - then the prizes could exceed 166.7 million US$. This is not counting if bets and balances are in bitcoins, undergoing passive appreciation. If only 10,000 days were wagered, it would be (10,001/2)*10,000=50M. If only 5000 days were wagered, this scheme would give (5001/2)*5000=12.5M.” The first term represents approximation to the average bet per day from 1 to 5000 (5001/2) and the second the number of days bet.”
In short, there would be a platform - whether centralized in a sovereign entity with a reputation and aligned interests or a sidechain/federation running a smart contract - that would allow victims to indicate their tormentors and bet on their heads, through a pseudo-anonymous mechanism, there could even be several markets of bets for each tormentor, expanding perfect discrimination, starting bets on the first day with 1US$ (or any other unit) and increasing bets on subsequent days - although the proportional gain is increasing with higher bets:
Ten people in arithmetic progression of 1US$ more per day bet, starting with 1, the 11# hitting would win 5x what they bet; the 31# , would win 15x what you bet; the 1001# would take 500x; 10,000 betting, the 10,001# would magnify 5000x the investment; 100,000 people betting, 100,001# would win 50,000x the stake; with 501,000 bets, the prize would be 250,000x the next daily bet; and so on.
Would a sicario bet 10,000 in one day to win 50 million? would you bet 1001 to receive 500,000? or both? The object of the bet with a prize of 500,000 on his head, would not bet 1000 a day that he had to expose himself (violent or natural death, as an invasive medical procedure) preventing other people from having gains from his death these days and increasing your legacy?
If the answers to at least one of these questions is “yes”, then MAM is in demand – and it is capable of realigning responsibility and power.
3. Development: answers to Alan's questions
A simple solution to the decentralized identifier is to return the winnings to the address that sent the bet. The transaction, to make it even clearer, could contain an indication of the day in a message to the address that the escrow/smart contract defined as the destination. Bitcoin addresses are pseudo-anonymous and until their control is proven with key signing the attribution of ownership is probabilistic. In this solution, the identifier would be more private when it comes to good practice to transact said amounts to place the bet and receive the prize - if done on-chain.
A more elaborate solution to maintain privacy (of the bettors, but mainly of the winner) would be to run this smart contract on another layer - and alternatives already exist, such as confidential transactions on Liquid4; privacy solutions on the Lightning5 network; e, coinjoin and coinsawps6
As for the question of the decentralized oracle, a solution would be a contestation system in which, at any time, any participant could claim the end of the bet (indicating a certain date of death) and/or indicate their agreement or opposition to the fact having occurred on the indicated date. No one determines the outcome of a bet better than the parties who bet by desiring the outcome.
The payment deadline may be proportional to the difference between bettors who contested and agreed with the fact that it occurred on the indicated date. For example, if the payment deadline is (only in cases where there is more agreement than disagreement in whole percentage points):
Payment deadline = 30days+30days*[100-(accepted%-disagreed%)]
So, if you 100% agree, pay (and close the poll) in 30 days. If 80% agree and 10% object, pay in 930 days (30+30*[30]). If 50% agreed and no one disagreed, it pays in 1530 days (if you do not increase the sign of agreement or disagreement), if 30% agrees and 20% disagrees, it pays in 2730 days. Even with the minimal difference (1%) of agreeing than disagreeing, the system would still pay in 30+30*(99)=3000 days - less than 8.5 years.
This mechanism encourages the winner to prove the fact publicly - while allowing greater collection of evidence for a longer period of time, the lower the degree of convincing the other bettors.
In the previous article on the subject, in which the MAM would be a solution to liberate a country under totalitarian dictatorship with an internationally recognized parallel government in exile, the oracle could be centralized (with entities doing forensic analysis of images, DNA and sentencing in court) and the escrow would be solved: it was enough for the parallel government platform to receive deposits and make payments like any cefi exchange.
If the MAM is instituted without the support of a sovereign entity, then the escrow issue could be resolved through a smart contract that receives payments with date indications, messages from these addresses/dispute issuers/confirmation of closed bets and that makes the payment to the bettor winner. Another solution to the escrow problem is centralized: a reputable platform offering the service on the deep web - as there was Silk Road and Silk Road 2.0.
Conclusions
The issue of anonymity of payment is linked to the anonymity of the form of deposit and receipt - and its solution would be linked to the specific good practices of the medium used. On-chain, anonymity could be guaranteed with the acquisition of values used privately and the payment of prizes at the addresses that placed the winning bets. Furthermore, solutions at other layers already exist.
The oracle question is resolved by a contestation system. The more bettors confirm the date of the fact and the less bettors contest, the shorter the period to keep the poll and pay the winner soon. Most users would be motivated to manifest themselves sincerely, even to continue enjoying the benefits of the system in which they are users - and the majority without any advantage in behaving in a different way (in the case of ideological bettors, who bet desiring the result, even losing).
The escrow issue could be resolved with a sovereign entity starting the system; with someone with a reputation offering services on the deep web - as happened with Silk Road; or, ideally, with smart contract running in second layer.
Several issues were not discussed because they are outside the epistemological framework, such as the platform's remuneration and what to do with the resources when there is confirmation of death on a day that was not wagered.
Institutional #Bitcoin adoption incoming 🚀
You have two choices in #Bitcoin if you want to talk about it; learn patience and be prepared to hear the same objections over and over, or stop talking about it. The thankless task of education will not end for at least a decade."
Protestors in the 🇬🇧 UK react to an Aldi’s grocery store refusing to accept cash as payment 👀
https://nostr.build/av/423ac6644c2bd5a93f64cd1fe38d9b73924221e89590dfc7abd4c0c137d18e56.mp4
NEW: Canada has passed Bill C-18 aka the Online News Act. This legislation requires Google and Meta to pay Canadian media outlets for news content.
This bill is expected to give Canada’s struggling news agencies a $300 million+ windfall but Meta has already said they will simply block Canadians from posting the content on their platforms 👀😮
“I respect those who tell me the truth no matter how hard it is.”
— Michael Corleone
How Woke Twitter users view the political spectrum.
