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Super Testnet
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Open source dev w/ bitcoin focus | supertestnet.org bc1qefhunyf8rsq77f38k07hn2e5njp0acxhlheksn

Maybe, maybe not. I suppose you'll never no.

Plausible deniability is a wonderful thing.

I'm a huge fan of the FCMP idea and I look forward to seeing them implemented

It will make the fight much more fair

since it's a "dedicated device" for lightning transactions, it's not for web browsing

> You will need almost 1 TB of disk space for a bitcoin node

not if you do transaction pruning...though then there is some additional setup to ensure you can get the blocks you need when LN needs them

Replying to Avatar Expatriotic

nostr:nprofile1qqszmxrnkfdl9hdxzstgf4zdt6mk4avlzemc3fvwxcatzeclalhg0uspr3mhxue69uhkummnw3ezucnfw33k76twv4ezuum0vd5kzmqprpmhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wd68yct5dyhxxmmdqy28wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnwdaehgu3wvfnsryzw6e aren't they changing the protocol so that the Anon set is every monero transaction ever? Pretty sure this is either out of date or soon to be.

Plus not very nuanced to compare monero and lightning. Lightning is a notoriously heavy lift to do self custodially. Lots of errors and headaches. Monero just works

They are testing whether they can modify monero to use full chain membership proofs, and they hope to get it done this year: https://x.com/MoneroMavrick/status/1856881416987988406

> monero just works

I am not a privacy expert. That said, for serious privacy, I would start with this:

- Get a dedicated device

- Install TailsOS on it

- Download a bitcoin node and electrs

- Open electrum (comes with TailsOS)

- Set it to use your node (not electrum servers)

- Set it use tor (probably automatic on TailsOS, but check)

- Send bitcoin to electrum via a coinjoin

- Open channels with privacy focused peers (e.g. ecash mints)

they told us most of how they traced the Finnish guy's monero. After arresting him, they sent an information request to a swap service which knew precisely what address they sent the monero to (because monero does not encrypt the recipient address), and then they sent another information request to binance, who knew that address showed up as a "ring member" in a transaction to their exchange. So they knew it was him. Didn't require breaking any cryptography. Just following the trail through monero's public ledger.

wait no, don't "just" do anything -- if you want decent privacy, you have to do more than that