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Bitcoin Mises
496bf22b76e63553b2cac70c44b53867368b4b7612053a2c78609f3144324807
Software engineer. Building bitcoin tools. Currently building Live Wallet https://livewallet.space https://github.com/Jwyman328/LiveWallet/tree/main?tab=readme-ov-file#live-wallet

Almost impossible to stay at the top for long. Especially in the modern era where everyone is so well rounded.

Same, busy yet never felt too crowded, safe, and rather clean for a big city.

Thanks for the response, I agree the chain analysis was bad but now that you can choose your coordinator, and zksnarks shut down their coordinator, that shouldn't effect the actual coinjoin process.

As for the video, what makes this a bad coinjoin implementation vs. user error? Wasn't it the user's fault for combining post mixes? Wouldn't that happen in all post coinjoins, no matter the implementation? What made Wasabi so vulnerable to this happening?

Generally curious, thanks if you can provide any answer to my questions.

Definitely plan on it being open source. Might just add it to my current project Live Wallet (https://livewallet.space/#/) .

Having access to oxt and kycp apps and codebases right now would be really helpful, but I haven't been able to track them down since the feds went after samurai.

I am planning on building a utxo privacy analyzer, where you can select a series of privacy metrics to analyze a transaction by. The result will then say if the utxos included in the transaction passed or failed the various privacy metrics.

A few privacy metrics to watch for I have so far are,

- number of consecutive coinjoin rounds that a utxo came from.

- choose your anonymity set, aka how many txs should look like yours (aka equal output) in a tx.

- No change.

- no small change.

- no reused addresses

- reveal least amount of wealth

- reveal least amount of past tx history, aka don't combine utxos, especially not change outputs.

- don't mix post mixes (or any post mix tx change) from different rounds.

- don't mix postmix (or any post mix tx change) and non mixed.

- reduce change detection

- no round number payments.

- no same script type for the inputs and only one output.

- largest output amount heuristic (this is weak)

- spending to an exchange, it is obvious you are the change

- break the unnecessary input heuristic.

- more than one change output.

- change output should be of similar size of payment

- no dust attacked coins.

- break the common input ownership heuristic.

- break volume or other pattern recognition analysise.

- the change should not always be in the same output position.

- timing analysis, make sure you are not always receiving transactions on the same day.

- make sure do not spend utxos are not spent

- no kyc coins.

Does that sound like a useful tool to you?

What is your critique against wasabi wallet? I have been looking into privacy UIs lately and searching for criticisms of different implementations.

Watching nostr:npub1rxysxnjkhrmqd3ey73dp9n5y5yvyzcs64acc9g0k2epcpwwyya4spvhnp8 tutorial on Wasabi Wallet and damn the UI is really cool. It has a great interface for features that analyze the anonymity set of a UTXO, as well as evaluating how private a transaction is. Super cool! It makes me want to add similar privacy analysis to Live Wallet.

The idea is, you would select a series of privacy best practices you want a transaction to follow, and then have your previous transaction or yet-to-be-broadcast PSBT analyzed. You will receive a result showing how the transaction holds up against the privacy metrics you are measuring it against. If it fails, it will provide suggestions for improvements you can make.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52pSd3I1nac

Try it out at

livewallet.space/#/sandbox

nostr:note1a59rjk3axqdxkqqsc29dej2pn5dnejx7hg4u7tfvmh4lfgls0dhqw4q25c

They have the freedom to do it, but that doesn't me it is right. They are actively pushing people down a path of losing money and probably don't give a shit.