It arguably is one of the few devices in the Bitcoin signing device space that properly explains its threat model, risks and benefits.
If you are wondering, your bank card is more secure than 95% of HWWs.
STM32s are already known to be not very difficult to dump.
Along with existing attacks on the DeepCover SE and the ATECC one, this allows extraction of the seed.
The ATECC one especially has poor track record having been defeated by the same attack on 3 revisions of the chip.
It is who knows how many years of IPP Everywhere and I still cannot set the color mode for prints and only get a single quality mode choice
it’s not as fast either for going through a 200-page datasheet for one specific detail nostr:note1hmq4hjz9p5tz8g0zv7g9gg6jx58fvh6tgrazyqecsan6lp2jv99s7gmfdg
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Option 3: move to somewhere less shit
Congratulations your seeds are more secure against physical damage than a $200 gimmick
Someone make a $1000 rugged HWW pls so we can get scammed even more and pretend we are enterprise users
- influencers
The seed backup in the corner: ._.
Oh wait buy our $50 piece of milled steel that should be $20 nostr:note1wfew3pqlvh4ksfl3epkmmfskyh5ztjly06fkppzdg33pxnk84v7sxfwwhm
For it to be experimentation you first need to evaluate if it could work in theory before in practice.
Instead this is just trying random useless shit for the sake of it.
it really isn’t a good hammer either for 50% of things
to be honest, the cashu protocol has been having the same issues with incompetent design as with some nostr NIPs
To be honest this feels exactly like everyone trying to integrate NFTs. Or AI.
At this point why not self custody? What’s the point of having a mint?
Remember how they tried to add NFTs to everything? This is exactly like that
Oh so self custody with a shiny label? nostr:note1kxwsuxhaq48m8ahn0q6vh3aey2qym5fgkztsj8889n9h82wnazjq97g4vn
And that’s rare
Nostr is not that malleable.
“why not enhance the fediverse?”
- fediverse people on nostr
I’m working on a lot more than that… :)
red flags:
- using “open source” as audited
- no proper explanation of cryptographic scheme
- devices used in signing are not isolated or protected
