If true, we should update the trolley problem to be the “guy who maintains the local water supply problem”
Looking forward to seeing if some news organization can publish a 1700 word article within 1 second of the FOMC release
So we may need perpetual issuance for security then. Maybe the sixth halving could be the last?
The alignment problem is super doomy. As long as we VCs with billions of dollars believing it is gods work to live out Friedmans doctrine of shareholder value and we have no ability to tell them “no” doom will be not far on the horizon.
It’s not intended to be a meta comment on OP either I just can’t delete so I feel the need to apologize
I will leave now
I’ve been having trouble replying to the wrong posts accidentally sorry
No it absolutely will not but good luck with that
The pursuit of the block reward pits miners against one another in a race for the reward. In the presence of a desirable block reward, miners who are competing against one another will always push the blockchain forward. However, people have confused what this means. This notion that adversarial competition strengthens security only applies to the pursuit of the next block reward; it does not apply to anything else in the Bitcoin ecosystem. Once the block reward falls below other possible incentives for miners, there could be a massive phase shift in security.
We have no idea what happens then.
Or if one stupid nation that nobody likes decides to go all in on it
You have to spend enough to protect yourself against any coalition of adversaries who may stand against you. Your adversaries in turn need to be able to spend enough to ward off any attack that you and some of your allies threaten them with which means they have to spend more meaning well now you need to increase your budget because all of your adversaries just increased their budgets and so on und so weiter until you just sort of say gosh I don’t know this game seems kind of silly
The entire field of coalitional game theory is based on the study of when adversaries will collude and when they will not collude. This is a very rich space full of interesting scenarios.
Storing gold has relatively fixed and predictable costs. You don’t have to update your vault size to be one brick higher than the vault in some other country. Your threat model involves people who are physically near your vault.
This is an argument why governments will resist having it become a reserve currency. Why would you want a reserve currency that you have to have a special set of weapons and a new budget to defend?
The other thing here is that the second the government starts mining with defense budgets every basement miner is just running an expensive heater. All the mining corporations will shut down and we’ll have some form of NATO or OPEC or TPP negotiation the mining which means they’ll be able to enforce sanctions at the drop of a hat.
By this time we’re a bit afield from peer to peer electronic cash.
Why would all the adversarial/competitive pressures tilt the system toward stability and not towards instability?
The halvenings are going to make the security budget an extremely small fraction of market cap. Fees might pick up a little but this will be a major obstacle for many purposes. At some point during one of these market crashes when all the miners are over leveraged and going bankrupt, someone with a billion dollar or so will be able to come in and take the whole thing over.
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