To put it in perspective, I spent more time considering a $50 buy for a used computer than I've spent hearing about drive chain, that's a problem. I had hoped to listen to guys take, I think I understand it from a technical perspective, I'm not against the idea, but I have reservations and I'd like to see it discussed some more.

A miner activated soft fork can create a new transaction type without everyone else patching their nodes? Can't we just try normal merged mining for a while and not jump to a consensus change for side chains? If miners want to run side chains can't they just run a node for those, is that a bigger ask than pushing a masf? If side chains pick up adoption then drive chains will be an upgrade that saves space on chain so the upgrade will be obvious, and if they don't then we haven't lost anything.

Poor fkn baby. nostr:note15afkvjlj4l9773na3cnwnlzqvfsuwpsxu6r2nea33ymeeztyrymqmx4d09

If you want to make BIP300/drivechains/decentralized sidechains happen in a way that isn’t embarrassingly insecure, work on StratumV2, work on Braidpool, bring P2Pool back.

Without substantial increases in mining decentralization these things make zero sense.

But he didn’t support Bip 300, or did he ?

Except it’s not permissionless. Changes to Bitcoin require permission from the developers, the miners and, ultimately, the users.

Drivechains are a novel concept, however they are a solution looking for a problem where there is no demand.

Coupled with the lack of trustless peg-out and opportunity for abuse, what you’re left with is a threat vector in which the risk outweighs the benefit.

What is Layer 2 Labs path to profitability to provide return on the $3m to its investors?

Personally, it’s a nack from me. I wouldn’t care if Satoshi himself wrote the BIP proposal.

Except it’s not permissionless. Changes to Bitcoin require permission from the developers, the miners and, ultimately, the users.

Drivechains are a novel concept, however they are a solution looking for a problem where there is no demand.

Coupled with the lack of trustless peg-out and opportunity for abuse, what you’re left with is a threat vector in which the risk outweighs the benefit.

What is Layer 2 Labs path to profitability to provide return on the $3m to its investors?

Personally, it’s a nack from me. I wouldn’t care if Satoshi himself wrote the BIP proposal.

bip300 is the equivalent of handing your gun to one of your opponents in a mexican standoff

Why would my stance on one particular BIP matter for anything I have said above?

When I see BIP300 being mentioned by Roger Ver all my hackles go up Grrrrrrrrrr

Politics are everywhere. Taproot was political. The question is do we want to explicitly etch it into the protocol.

Politics are everywhere. Taproot was political. The question is do we want to explicitly etch it into the protocol.

Miners should not support any “projects” with their hash power. They should support the network. THE (singular) NETWORK. That’s all they need to do. Hash. Over and over. They can do so on whatever pool they want.

I’m sorry you couldn’t find anyone to debate Sztorc. Listening now.

What BIP300 boils down to, as Sztorc said in the interview, is a peg-in/peg-out mechanism. My main problem is with the peg-out. Sztorc repeatedly says, and said in the interview, that there’s no downside. I disagree. The downside is increased incentives for miner centralization and politicization.

Let me back up this claim. I’m sorry, but it’ll take a few paragraphs. First I’ll explain how the BIP300 peg-out mechanism works, then how it incentivizes centralization.

From the BIP300 abstract:

> In Bip300, txns are not signed via cryptographic key. Instead, they are "signed" by hashpower, over time. Like a big multisig, 13150-of-26300, where each block is a new "signature".

This is the crux of BIP300. Traditional Bitcoin outputs are locked by secrets and unlocked by signed transactions (proof-of-key). For the peg-out process to be decentralized, Drivechain needed a different unlocking mechanism.

Under BIP300, block producers vote with hashrate on which withdrawal requests they support. Bundles with sufficient votes succeed. Bundles with insufficient votes are dropped.

The capabilities of a 51% attacker on mainchain are well known. They can rewrite history, but they can’t steal coins other than writing history all the way back to when those coins were received. They can censor transactions, but this would incentivize competing miners to ramp up as fees increase, etc.

Under BIP300, a 51% attacker gains a new ability. Such an attacker can sweep sidechain escrow. That is, they can propose and then cast all the 13151 votes to withdraw the mainchain locked BTC supporting the peg.

In this scheme, the attacker’s blocks are otherwise normal, valid blocks, taking fees and earning subsidy. That is, the attacker is earning mainchain coin and rolling history forward. No rewriting necessary.

A cohort of mining pools could collaborate to carry out such an attack, without even bringing all the hash together under one controller. To do this: have the withdrawal bundle pay out proportionally to the participating pools. Any block creator can propose such a heist, and everyone’s interest is to play along. Individual miners who want in on the action can then switch their hash to any of the participating pools.

One final note on politicization. Miners today choose pools based on various criteria like fee rate, pool size, payout schedule, payout mechanism (Lightning/on-chain), customer support, privacy, ease-of-use etc. But for the most part, miners are profit-maximizing businesses that choose pools based on profitability.

Under BIP300, there will be a new criterion for choosing pools: how the pool votes. Choosing where to point your hash will become a political choice in addition to an economic one.

I have other concerns about BIP300, but the pressure to centralize and politicize mining is my main one. Thanks for reading. 🙏

Scalability problem?? ‘Layer 3’ to the rescue by splitting the blockchain into multiple shards, each of which can process transactions in parallel…

And only Drivechain & sidechain can fit this criterion! nostr:note1pevzc2v9teflqedqchr6fp0kaup96wnnwknfef47pk5czkd3d8vql9shwx

This seems like it was specifically talking about drivechains or other softforks.

For that topic, it can be avoided easily.

Push complexity down the line into the future. Let people learn. Let people build. It’s not critical to functionality now. There will be a hard fork in the future, but let’s address that complexity then and not now. We have time.

Why change? Seriously. Monero is most interesting and you can already atomic swap between bitcoin and monero at will. Services like joinmarket already anonymise bitcoin without leaving the chain.

As for why not... Do you really want people blaming bitcoin when devs of their sidechain rug them while they are locked up for 3 months? Would they be right to blame bitcoin? Fuck no. Would the press have a field day and most normies believe it was bitcoins fault? absolutely.

TLDR, Drivechains is just shitcoiners trying to affinity scam. Why give them bitcoins shine? Why allow them to smear their feces on bitcoin?

Not yet true.

We need a few more OP codes before we can handle mass adoption.

But Drivechains are not the way.

From the BIP300 Abstract:

> In Bip300, txns are not signed via cryptographic key. Instead, they are "signed" by hashpower, over time. Like a big multisig, 13150-of-26300, where each block is a new "signature".

In essence, block builders (pools) cast votes via special transactions on which sidechains to activate, deactivate and overwrite. They also vote on peg-out transactions (sidechain escrow withdrawal).

So as I understand it, miners will want to consider pools’ policies with respect to these questions when deciding where to point their hash. Not just the economics of income stream.

For example, one pool may support the activation of an NFT-focused sidechain, while another doesn’t. Miners will have to pick which pool they want to support.