a1
moarch
a1cb3a0be0474615fb6c8a34803dd4a867c6703397fb61d1059b872679c73edb
monarch

nostr:note1jjhtrh29h0gf0gdpcqkhw0ch2taj5srwcs98h7pt2g5tqpr9g46qvjzw6w

#bitcoin fixes this

Replying to Avatar corndalorian

Go zap yourself

What alternatives do I have to remain private if the business only accepts Venmo?

1. Can sidechains mine blocks faster than the main chain?

Yes, sidechains can potentially mine blocks faster than the main chain. They can have different consensus rules and block intervals, depending on the specific design of the sidechain.

2. Can participants in a sidechain unilaterally withdraw, or does the bundle need to be done by sidechain miners, or the sidechain owner?

In most drivechain proposals, participants can initiate a withdrawal, but the withdrawal must be processed by miners in a specific withdrawal period. This helps to secure the funds and prevent double-spending across chains.

3. Can multiple withdraw bundles be done from a sidechain concurrently, or does it need to wait the 3-6 months' worth of blocks for success or failure?

Most drivechain proposals involve a withdrawal waiting period to ensure security and consensus. Concurrent withdrawal bundles would generally have to wait for the predetermined period for success or failure.

4. Can multiple sidechains be having withdraw bundles at the same time?

Yes, multiple sidechains can operate withdrawal processes concurrently. They are independent of each other.

5. How much blockspace is required for blind merge mining all 256 slots assuming maximal sidechains?

This depends on the specific implementation and the blocksize of the sidechains. More extensive use of sidechains would, of course, require more blockspace.

6. Can a sidechain have its own set of up to 256 side chains branching off of it?

Technically, a sidechain could have its own sidechains. However, this would complicate the security and operation of the network and may not be practical in all scenarios.

7. How feasible is atomic swaps between these sidechains?

Atomic swaps between sidechains could be implemented, but it would require specific support and might introduce complexities. In the scenario you mentioned, it would likely require a withdrawal and then a new peg-in, with the associated time delay.

8. If there is no POW on the side chain itself, how are blockspace limits and fees to be handled, and how is tx spam in a sidechain addressed?

Sidechains can have their own consensus mechanisms, fee structures, and spam controls. Without PoW, a sidechain might use another consensus mechanism or rely on the main chain's PoW for security.

9. How can drivechains be decentralized and permissionless to avoid miner control on creation?

Decentralization in drivechains can be a complex issue. By design, miners play a significant role in the security and operation of drivechains. Various proposals and ongoing research aim to balance decentralization, security, and functionality in drivechain implementations.

Ensure that the Tor configuration file (usually torrc) is set up to allow connections to the private relay. You may need to specify the address and port of the relay in the configuration.

Replying to Avatar Lyn Alden

For reference, here are my main thoughts on the current Bitcoin softfork ideas/dramas to those who care.

For context with regards to wherever it might matter, I have a 12-year background as an engineer initially and eventually an engineering manager, including overseeing electrical/mechanical/software for an aviation simulation facility, but although I have written code here and there in my early days, I am certainly *NOT* a software engineer. My career work is on electrical engineering and multi-discipline engineering management, and my master's degree is in engineering management, with an emphasis on systems engineering and engineering economics. Any viewpoint I have is from an engineering/systems management perspective or an economics perspective, not a programmer perspective.

I follow multiple software Bitcoin experts on various topics, many of which disagree with each other, similarly to how I followed my various lead engineers when I was working in engineering management.

The U.S. Constitution is well-written but of course not perfect. It's a good document, especially after the amendments it has had. The most recent amendment was over 30 years ago, and it is minor enough that most people don't know what it is. The second most recent one was over 50 years ago, and that one is also pretty minor, imo, and most people don't know that one either. The Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and a then a handful of key amendments after that to fix key issues with race and gender voting and so forth, have been the foundational aspects of this whole Constitutional project.

In order to change the U.S. Constitution, you need both a supermajority in Congress and a supermajority among States. Good luck getting that. And that near-immutability is exactly why the Constitution is valuable. Even if it was better written and included all sorts of things I liked, if it were easier to change, I would consider it to be a *worse* foundation than it is now. The near-immutability is the critical part. A nearly-immutable good document, is a great document, if it serves as the foundation of something important.

When it comes to Bitcoin, the aspect that I view as being the most valuable is its near-immutability. We have a global open-source ledger foundation that gives us savings and payment/settlement technology. It makes hard trade-offs in order to remain reasonably decentralized. And yet, Bitcoin can settle more transactions per year than Fedwire does, which is the U.S. base settlement layer, which handles (not a typo) 1 quadrillion dollars worth of gross settlement volumes per year. Bitcoin does that function but is global, open-source, and has its own scarce units. Various layers can expand that scalability, (Lightning, sidechains, fedimints, custodial environments, etc). Certain softforks to the base layer may also add some new scalability options (covenants, drivechains, zero-knowledge proofs, etc). But those softforks present risks to the whole project, unless they have a supermajority of support and are considered to be of low technical+incentive risk.

When I was an engineering manager for my aviation facility, if I were to approve a major new change and help fund it, it would be because the supermajority of my senior technical leads supported it, and because they could convince me of it. Objective truth tends to be easy to share between rational people that listen to each other. In contrast, subjective things that are more contested of course tend to be harder. If I liked a new change but it didn't have a supermajority, I respected these divergent opinions and wanted to know why they saw it differently. Unless it was in an area where I was *specifically* the facility expert in (in my case, the electrical/control aspects within our organization's aviation simulators), I would never go with a minority opinion among my technical leads and override the majority of my technical leads.

One of the most common problems I encountered in my career was over-engineering. Not a single person knows every detail about how an aviation simulator works (which was my field of work). There are software experts, graphical design experts, mechanical experts, electronics experts, pilot experts, and then business experts that have to figure out what is valuable to clients and how to get the required stuff and how to make the whole thing economical and thus well-incentivized. Systems engineering, practically by definition, is the science of managing a project that is more complex than any one human mind can possibly understand. Any major project engineer/manager has to deal with this dilemma.

As it pertains to over-engineering, many people often have pet projects that they care about, or want to make really cool complex things, that are not economical or not robust. Endless changes can create endless complexity, which are hard to maintain, are less reliable, and so forth. The most beautiful engineering designs are often the most simple at the foundation. Complexity can exist in layers or silos built on or around that foundation, which reduces contagion risk to the simple-but-robust foundation.

In short, if you you can't convince a supermajority, then maybe your idea isn't right or needs more work. Maybe the problem is on your end. Especially if the supermajority that you need to convince are intelligent relevant people (in Bitcoin's case: software developers, node-runners, miners, capital allocators, etc).

And of course, foundations like the U.S. Constitution or the Bitcoin base layer are far more important than the engineering frameworks of some random aviation simulation facility, so the standards are higher.

So, how do I assess proposed softforks as someone who hasn't written code in a decade but tries to follow the designs and economics of various proposals where possible? I look towards technical leads, and look for a supermajority of serious stakeholders, and need the proposal to clearly make sense to me technically and economically.

I view Bitcoin as being valuable due to its near-immutability. That is the source of its monetary premium. And so as follows, from a project management perspective regarding what is among the most serious of all possible projects:

-The first rule of Bitcoin is you do not break Bitcoin.

-The second rule of Bitcoin is you do not break Bitcoin.

-The third rule of Bitcoin is you do not break Bitcoin.

-The fourth rule of Bitcoin is that, around the margins, you try to find conservative ways to improve Bitcoin that are clear enough to get a supermajority.

Therefore, my view on softforks is that I defer to the supermajority of experts I trust, while also needing it to make sense to me personally. I'm agnostic towards many softforks, since I don't have the detailed software expertise to be relevant between similar proposals. As proposed softworks gain momentum, I check to see if they make sense to me, and then look for a supermajority.

Bitcoin is valuable due to its near-immutability. If it can be changed by minority factions, then the relevance of the project over the long arc of time is limited. To the extent that it's going to be any sort of important base layer, that near-immutability, much like the U.S. Constitution, is critical. To that extent, any proposed change to Bitcoin is not just a software thing; it's an economics thing as well.

Therefore, if proponents of a given softfork try to find a way to push itself on the network without a supermajority of technical experts and economic actors, then whether or not I like it, I will oppose it. That's a way to turn me from neutral to opposed. Because that near-immutability is what I would fight for. I only support highly agreed-upon changes. Whatever small piece that my node, my voice, and my money can do, I err towards the near-immutability.

Your stance on near-immutability, as applied to both the U.S. Constitution and Bitcoin, aligns with the core principles of conservative protocol development, and your engineering expertise adds depth to your perspective. Regarding the Pay to Script Hash (P2SH) softfork, activated in BIP 16, the implementation introduced a new standard transaction type using OP_HASH160 OP_EQUAL, allowing the sender to commit to a script without knowing its full details. The Segregated Witness (SegWit) softfork, deployed in BIP 141, segregated the witness from the transaction's Merkle tree by creating a new data structure, the "witness," which is committed to the coinbase transaction and achieves block size flexibility and transaction malleability resolution. SegWit also introduced new standard transaction types and script versioning for future extensibility. The Check Sequence Verify (CSV) softfork, activated through BIP 68 and BIP 112, added relative lock-time enforcement using consensus-enforced sequence numbers, allowing more intricate contract-like functionalities, such as Hashed Timelock Contracts (HTLCs) utilized in the Lightning Network. Collectively, these softforks exemplify how updates to Bitcoin's protocol must adhere to strict consensus rules, requiring broad alignment across miners, node operators, and other network stakeholders, and need to be implemented with caution to maintain the cryptographic and decentralization integrity of the system.

My first post on Plebeian Market! #plebchain #bitcoin #nostr

https://plebeian.market/auctions/QJFQ

Replying to Avatar preston

Drivechains

Alright people, we are playing a game of chess here. The one thing, the absolute one thing, we can't do is give up the king. To give up the king, in my humble opinion, is to mess up the base layer. This mistake would disrupt the delicate incentive structure that ensures sound money. That sound money pegs the extremely fragile credit markets and out-of-control G7 policymakers that are creating clown world with their CB fiat policies.

We don’t need the sound, pegged, money to move fast, we don’t need the money to do smart swoopty things, we just need it to be pegged, immutable, and digitally sailable to actually stop the madness of clown world.

By introducing a whole lot of technical complexity to the base layer and potentially screwing with the incentives all so we can connect to a bunch of centralized shitcoin projects is like playing offense with the king when you’re down 7 pieces and the other player still has their entire back row at their disposal.

A. Why the rush!?

B. Why not just go use Monero if you need that level of anominity in your transactions. Why do you have to have it in a wrapper via drivechains?

C. Why risk the king without deep understanding and testing of the technical risk and potential change to incentives?

The beauty of Bitcoin is you can build it and softfork it, and we’ll let the community vote with their nodes. BUT, I for one, have no use for drivechains (that doesn’t mean everyone is like me). And as a result, I will not be updating my node and running any attempted “secret” softfork updates by the miners.

Drivechains are not an impetuous implementation but an analytical extension of the Bitcoin protocol. They employ a federated consensus model, allowing Bitcoin's main chain to interoperate with sidechains without changing the Nakamoto consensus rules of the primary layer.

The suggestion to use Monero disregards the cryptographic nuances of Drivechains, which facilitate trustless sidechains using Merkle Mountain Ranges (MMRs) and Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) proofs. Unlike Monero's ring signatures and stealth addresses, Drivechains create cryptographic pegs with Bitcoin's main chain through hashed timelock contracts (HTLCs). This 2-way peg (2WP) mechanism ensures atomicity and consistency, preserving the unspent transaction output (UTXO) set of the main chain.

Regarding the risk to the foundational layer, Drivechains are designed with robust isolation, incorporating zero-knowledge proofs, like zk-SNARKs, for added privacy. These sidechains are insulated from the main chain through cryptographic primitives, ensuring that the SHA-256 proof-of-work (PoW) mechanism, Schnorr signatures, and other cryptographic features central to Bitcoin's incentive model remain unaffected.

What are all the steps needed to create a 24 word seedphrase using dice?

Airgapped laptop using Tails on a USB with no persistence enabled to do the math is ok.

Bonus points for how to add a passphrase.

#asknostr #bitcoin

Now you just need to find at least two more in separate locations!

#asknostr #asksatoshi nostr:npub17u5dneh8qjp43ecfxr6u5e9sjamsmxyuekrg2nlxrrk6nj9rsyrqywt4tp nostr:npub1dergggklka99wwrs92yz8wdjs952h2ux2ha2ed598ngwu9w7a6fsh9xzpc

Given that SegWit transactions can theoretically still be malleably spent in the event of a blockchain reorganization, what would be the implications for Layer 2 solutions like the Lightning Network, which rely on transaction IDs to remain constant? Are there any proposed modifications to SegWit or alternative solutions to address this potential issue more robustly?

What is an iOS app or method I can use to have an alarm go every n minutes, such as 30? #asknostr #exercise

No, this is something I have been working on for a while.

The suggestion for using a blockchain or smart contracts in the guide was made with the intention of ensuring transparency, immutability, and potential automation of the distribution process. However, these goals can potentially be achieved without blockchain technology, depending on the design and requirements of the system. Maybe like this:

1. Setting Up the Matching Pool

-Determine the Pool Size: Decide on the total amount of Bitcoin in the matching pool.

-Secure the Pool Funds: Utilize traditional financial mechanisms or a secure multi-signature Bitcoin wallet.

2. Collecting Contributions

-Utilize Nostr for Data Collection: Leverage Nostr's decentralized relays to gather and record individual preferences for funding.

-Accept Bitcoin Contributions: Use Bitcoin addresses for receiving contributions.

3. Calculating Matching Funds

-Retrieve Contribution Data from Nostr: Use Nostr to access the data on individual contributions.

-Apply the Quadratic Funding Formula: Utilize software to calculate the matching funds according to the formula.

4. Distributing the Funds

-Manual or Automated Distribution: Depending on the system's requirements, distribution could be manual (handled by a trusted entity) or automated using traditional banking systems or Bitcoin transactions.

-Record Keeping: Maintain detailed logs of the transactions within the system. Transparency could be ensured by publishing anonymized or aggregated data as required.

Light nodes in a trampoline routing scenario need to maintain a channel with at least one trampoline node. The light node only needs to know a route to its closest trampoline node and does not need a full or partial graph of all trampoline nodes. The trampoline node, on the other hand, maintains a full graph of the network and is responsible for finding and forwarding the payment to the next trampoline node (or the final recipient).

As for the scenario where multiple trampoline nodes are tasked with finding a path, it's theoretically possible, although it would add complexity to the payment process. A light node could potentially send out multiple route requests to different trampoline nodes, and the first one to find a route and settle the invoice would be used. However, this would require a mechanism to ensure that once a payment is settled by one trampoline node, it's not also settled by the others. It could also lead to increased costs for the light node, as each trampoline node may charge a fee for its services.

Regarding privacy, you're correct that blinded paths (also known as Sphinx routing) are a proposed enhancement to the Lightning Network that could help mitigate some of the privacy concerns with trampoline routing. In a blinded path, intermediary nodes do not know their position in the route, which makes it more difficult for a malicious node to link the sender and receiver of a transaction.