When banks fear open source tools more than centralized breaches, the problem is not security. It is pure control.
Privacy is treated as a threat, sovereignty as malware, and self-custody as noncompliance.
Cypherpunks write code because permission is the real vulnerability.
"No man should work for what another man can mint“
Hi Cashu Centralization FanBoys
Satoshi build bitcoin for a reason… no mint… and you are all into Cashu?
nostr:nprofile1qqsgydql3q4ka27d9wnlrmus4tvkrnc8ftc4h8h5fgyln54gl0a7dgspp4mhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mqpxdmhxue69uhkuamr9ec8y6tdv9kzumn9wshkz7tkdfkx26tvd4urqctvxa4ryur3wsergut9vsch5dmp8pese6nj96 nostr:nprofile1qqs9pk20ctv9srrg9vr354p03v0rrgsqkpggh2u45va77zz4mu5p6ccppemhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mp0qy88wumn8ghj77tpvf6jumt99u4z2vcs does Bitchat actually use or store our geolocation data? I noticed it groups chats by geohash, so wondering if that info is ever sent to servers or could expose location risks.
Just want to understand how private it really is.
Never doxx another person!
Do most customers care today?
Are they solving a true problem?
Censorship
17 years after the bitcoin white paper
Mining highly centralized
Significant Spam on the time chain
Key core devs retired
Bitcoin stronger than ever? 👇
“It's using a peer-to-peer based encryption system, kind of similar to #bitcoin."
https://blossom.primal.net/69d497a09e65313c1f6c972e2df1a80fc5f4fb043c71621e269825157ff46195.mov
Good morning Rusty! But we dont embrace it, right?! You seemed to have given up and opened the floodgate
Did you read my post?
I hate ETH and NFTs
nostr:nprofile1qqsv2g4wyh4fgdf85qlqk82yflkarlw3uun0vswlqjzu2mqqejd0qzcpzemhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wd68ytnzv9hxgqg5waehxw309aex2mrp0yhxummnw3ezucn8rep8qq
1LdRcdxfbSnmCYYNdeYpUnztiYzVfBEQeC
JPEG spam is economic activity but it's extremely wasteful.
Store JPEGs in other places which are optimized for that like imgur, ipfs etc.
Bitcoin is money
Whaaaatsuuuup
#Fingerprinting Bitcoin Nodes Through Addr Message Patterns
Bitcoin nodes unintentionally leak identity across networks through the way they construct and forward addr messages. Each node maintains a table of known peers and periodically shares these with others. But the selection, ordering, and especially the timestamps embedded in these messages are not uniform. They reflect subtle patterns that are consistent over time.
Because timestamps are not randomized and because node address tables (AddrMan) have deterministic behaviors, an observer receiving addr messages from a node over Tor and later over clearnet can correlate the two. This effectively links the two sessions as coming from the same node, even if IP addresses or networks change. The node reveals itself without knowing it.
This is not a protocol bug but an emergent privacy weakness in the design of the address relay mechanism. It allows passive observers to fingerprint a node based purely on how it gossips addresses, without needing access to its mempool, block data, or outbound connections. It affects all Bitcoin Core nodes and any implementation using similar address handling logic.
Mitigations under discussion include stripping timestamps from shared addresses, introducing randomization in the address selection process, or even limiting the amount of shared peer data. But until those changes are widely adopted, the network remains vulnerable to low-effort, high-precision tracking.
