CIA launches public social media campaign, asking Russians to spy for them, using tor browser as a commutation method to provide Intel.
https://www.politico.eu/article/central-intelligence-agency-cia-russia-spy-united-states-us/
https://www.barrons.com/news/in-new-telegram-video-cia-urges-russians-leak-the-truth-d4087681
#CIA #Russia #tor #torproject
India recently 'blocked' 14 E2EE/P2P Apps, under the reasoning of terrorism usage, by advice from Indian intelligence agencies .While, likely that terrorists (Under Indian Gov definition) used/use these app, a ban signifies:
1. Indian authorities view E2EE/P2P communication as a threat and problem. This suggests Indian authorities may not have the technical & operational capabilities, or resources, to fully mitigate E2EE usage .
2. Authoritarianism is increasing in India.
#India #E2EE #P2P #Briar #Element
In the midst of NIS (South Korean Intelligence) having to pass on certain counter intelligence activities to the ROK police , North Korea and individual South Koreans were allegedly caught in espionage and spreading domestic anti-US & anti-Japan sentiment.
In a press release, the operation is referred to as a 'movie scenario' by ROK prosecutors. The South Koreans and North Koreans, used YouTube comments as just one obfuscation method. This case may be used to halt passover of certain CI activities from NIS to police in ROK.
#NothKorea #SouthKorea #DPRK #ROK #Espionage #Spy #Spies #US #Japan
If you want to have an English word within Farsi, you would need to wrap it. I would suggest opening an issue on the projects github, explaining your issue. They should be able to help with the wrapping.
Regarding Operation Medusa:
Key take aways:
It was not an FBI only operation. It was a 5-eyes operation. The FBI did not take down the entire 'Snake Network'. They merely led the US side.
Center 16 of the FSB is claimed to be behind the malware and attacks.
In 2014, after public researchers had identified the malware, Center 16 renamed the string 'the βUr0bUr()sGo#' to 'gLASs D1ick' within the malware - probably to give a middle finger to researchers investigating the malware. The malware is said to have the developers monikers included within the malware.
The malware was used to also target journalists and dissents. A US journalist, covering Russian affairs was targeted, as an example.
The malware modified TCP & HTTP packets for communication and exfiltration. The FBI imitated these modifications, with 'Perseus', in order to attribute and disable infected machines.
FBI argued they did not have the resources (man power with expertise) to physically disable the malware, so they requested (and were granted) remote search warrants.
#Russia #US #5Eyes #FBI #Malware #CyberSecurity
This is a cammon problem within linguistic, you wont find an easy solutiom, as there is no 'real' answer. A, somewhat, unsatisfying answer depends on which translation methodology you use (dynamic, literal, communicative etc.).
The best way is not to translate npub, or at least not the abbrivation/acronym directly, alternatively you could also create a specialized dictionary.
US Defence Intelligence Agency has released their, unclassified, annual threat testimony to the US's Senate Armed Services Committee. The key take aways are:
The Russian "new look army", that is modern army, is gone.
China is the DIA's top priority.
#China #Russia #Ukraine #UkraineRussiaWar
A US think tank claim that Russia is having severe problems controlling mercenary groups, like the Wagner Group. This could demonstrate upcoming problems within a defence campaign. The Wagner group may have conducted a blackmail campaign, in order for Russia to resume ammunition distribution to the Wagner Group.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2023
#Russia #Ukraine #UkrianeWar #Ukrainenewswar #UkraineRussiaWar
Russian nationalist and invasion of Ukraine advocate, Yevgeny Nikolayevich Prilepin, has been "heavily injured" in a remote car bomb explosion, killing 1 person. Ukrainian detained, with US also being blamed.
https://www.svoboda.org/a/v-nizhnem-novgorode-vzorvali-avtomobilj-zahara-prilepina/32399532.html
https://news.yahoo.com/russian-propagandist-zakhar-prilepin-heavily-115300825.html?guccounter=1
https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-65507910
#Ukraine #Russia
Auditors claim they have discovered >145,000 fabricated civil servants on government payrolls in Congo. Also >40,000 people are getting paid by the state despite not appearing on official staffing lists, costing Congo over $800 million a year.
"Congo: Billions For Bandit Bureaucrats"
https://www.strategypage.com/qnd/congo/articles/20230505.aspx#foo
#corruption
10, not bullet proof, signs of a potential malicious social media profile, used for phising & controlled by a non-western state actor.
1. Name is a western first name, with a non-western surname.
2. Profile picture is of an attractive person.
3. Profile picture is a stock photo (use reverse image tools)
4. Their job experience does not fit their profile picture (if it's portrait or selfie)
5. Their workplace is not a registered business within your country's official registers.
6. If their job is within recruitment.
7. Your mutuals can't immediately or easily verify their authenticity.
8. Is their profile text unusual within your country culture?
9. Does their posting contain unusually many grammatical errors or spelling mistakes?
10. Are they trying to make contact with a very lucrative job offer?
This is, of course, not bullet proof. Even my own profile would appear suspicious. However, it's good heuristics to follow, especially if you have a LinkedIn or Facebook profile.
Just stop STV, NRK & DR. Your so called 'investigative' reporting is deeply fueled with group think. A common cognitative dysfunction that lead to intelligence failure. Suggest you take the following bibliography into consideration during your next projects.
Heuer, R. (1999). "The psychology of intelligence analysis." US Government Printing.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). "Judgment under uncertainty:
Heuristics and biases." Cambridge University Press.
#sepol #semedier #nopol #nomedier #dkpol #dkmedier
"Gaming public opinion: The CCPβs increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations" by ASPI
"How surreptitious shipping is helping Russia" by Financial Times
Sounds like Ukraine's CI methodology needs revamping or shorter rotations of CI officers.
https://www.politico.eu/article/spy-witch-hunt-ukraine-russia-war-traitor/
A thread on the recent Meta Q1 Adversarial Threat Report. Main key taken always are:
Actions were taken against 3 espionage operations, linked to South Asian countries. These cases involved the APT groups Bahamut (A service for hire group), Patchwork (possibly India state - or "useful idiots" for India) and an unnamed Pakistani state linked group.
Actions were also taken against 6 coordinated inauthentic behavior networks (Public perception management operations), in US, Iran, China, Venezuela, Togo, Georgia and Burkina Farso.
The espionage operations heavily relied on social engineering, by creating profiles that could withstand scrutiny for untrained eyes, posing as journalists, military personal, job recruiters and women looking for romantic relationship. The APT groups also relied on low sophisticated malware, in order to bypass application store (like Google Play Store) scrutiny.
The coordinated inauthentic behavior networks utilized social engineering by pretending to be news media organizations, NGOs and hacktivist groups. These networks were not limited to Facebook only, but also operated on all major social media platforms.
The Iranian public perception management operation (Commonly known as a psyop to the public), claimed to be a hacktivist group which had hacked news organizations, transport organizations, dating services, educational institutions, an airport and a government institution.
Chinese public perception management programs also appears to have begun experimenting with new strategies used by other nations, such as troll farms and using marketing and PR firms. They appear to have shifted towards the public perception methods commonly used by Russia and some Western Countries, like hiring freelance writers and recruiting protestors. Noticeably a China public perception management operation managed to co-opt a NGO in Africa.
#Psyop #China #Iran #US #Russia #Meta
"Iranian Insider and British Spy: How a Double Life Ended on the Gallows" by Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, for The New York Times.
First off, the article does not give any evidence that Mr Akbari was a SIS assets.
Anyhow, what's noteworthy from the article is:
1. "In 2019, Mr. Akbari flew to Iran for a final timeΒ after Mr. Shamkhani, theΒ Supreme National Security CouncilΒ head, told him the country needed him on an urgent nuclear and defenseΒ matter, his brother said." - SIS wouldn't this, unless, of course, Mr Akbari deemed it fit and agreed to it. If such was the casr, the SIS took a substantial risk and which didn't pan out.
2. "At some point, Iran discovered that Mr. Akbari was the source of the Fordo leak, according to theΒ two Iranians with connections to the Revolutionary Guards, information thatΒ was confirmed by Russian intelligence. It is unclear how Russia, a close ally of Iran, discovered the information." This is very noteworthy. If reliable, would not want to be doing the 2 year CI rotation when this was discovered.
3. "Iranian officials said on state media after his execution that they had him regularly log in to a computer provided by the British and communicate with his handlers to mislead them." - If that was the case, the SIS would have none we was compromised. If MrΒ Akbari was an asset, he would have been able to notify SIS without raising suspension.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/01/world/middleeast/british-spy-execution-iran.html
#Britian #Russia #Iran
NSA Cyber Security Director warns, that Russia and GRU APTs, like Sandworm (a.k.a Voodoo Bear, Iron Viking & Telebots), may ramping up the supply chains attacks on Ukrainian Aid (Humanitarian & Military) with Europe & US.
https://cyberscoop.com/nsa-russian-ukraine-supply-chain-ransomware/
DK 'Investigative' Journalist: "We have been given access to a program that Intelligence Services & Law Enforcement, use to map networks and uncover their infrastructure"
Everyone else: "Lol, you are using Maltego'
Anyone who wish to be given access to a program "Intelligence Services & Law Enforcement, use to map networks and uncover their infrastructure" according to a DK 'investigative' journalist, can download it for free at: https://www.maltego.com/downloads/
This 'investigative' documentary, by STV, NRK & DR, is getting more and more cringe.
#Nordstream #nopol #sepol #dkpol
Recommended reading for these 'investigate' journalist:
Levy, N. "Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good People." Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2022.
Neil Levy - Neil Levy is Professor of Philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics.
#Nordstream #nopol #sepol #dkpol