ff
ff8b6e10
ff8b6e10f723edbd8b894910988d001e377a593ef09139bb7200b3c3c81f7082

No, you don’t.

I will admit that Elon on Twitter is a 🤡. I fully agree that Doge is a shitcoin and Elon is currently doing anti-freedom things on the network he bought.

But Elon, when it comes to 🚀, is a visionary genius giga-brain 🧠 who has changed the course of space flight forever through the power of first principles thinking.

The fact that he can be so brilliant in some areas and so moronic in other areas fucks with a lot of people who just want a simple narrative where he’s all 🧠 or all 🤡, all the time.

Reality is more complicated.

Get over your preconceptions about Elon and educate yourself about the magnitude, impact, and difficulty of what SpaceX has already accomplished and what they are on the road to accomplishing, and why it matters.

https://waitbutwhy.com/2015/08/how-and-why-spacex-will-colonize-mars.html

https://www.youtube.com/@EverydayAstronaut

https://m.youtube.com/@scottmanley

I was just discussing this with a close friend yesterday, and he didn’t get it. So I forwarded this to him. I hope it sinks in. Thanks for the share!

Thought experiment:

How can we 10X the number of bitcoin nodes running in a distributed, trustless way?

Turnkey software solutions make it easy for people to set up a node but the hardware is often overpriced and overhyped, while the software provides a central point of capture (What do you do if your Raspbery Pi Node Software Provider goes rogue and auto-updates all their users to an evil fork?)

So I’m toying with the idea of mad market devices with the bitcoin software burned into the hardware in a write-once way. Nodes can’t be upgraded remotely since it’s basically an ASIC for a particular version of the consensus model.

But how can you trust the hardware to truly be write-once and/or not have a backdoor? How can you allow updates for auxiliary software like Tor and Electrum?

Thoughts?

Or is it just a solution in search of a problem?

😂😂😂 nostr:note1w8nq5y0fc42d3s07nxljxsenqw0amkw9k35c2yaefkew2aeh2umq0nkcuy

But also: The ACLU used to defend Nazi’s right to free [hate] speech while simultaneously decrying their speech as abhorrent, because the 1st Amendment was that important to that organization at the time. I think it would be good to get back to that. To be super clear: Nazis are narrow-minded bigots. I don’t support them at all. I think they should all se the error of their ways and reform like a few have.

But the idea of the ACLU supporting the rights of even that sort of speech should be held up as the golden standard of free speech.

We have to protect the free speech of even the outliers at either extreme of the bell curve. As soon as we start truncating the tails of that curve, where does it stop?

This was my first time actually hearing RFK Jr. speak.

His voice was jarring at first because I had never heard it before, but after only a couple’s minutes of listening, his voice fell away as I continued to listen to his words.

I went on to watch several more clips from the hearings, and I’ll go on to watch more after I post this, but I have to say: I want to hear more that RFKJR has to say, even if I’ll likely disagree strongly with some of it.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=GEAm21alji0

I’m tempted to redirect my incoming weekly DCA sats (or a percentage of them) to the Bitcoin Defense Fund for a while, because this Craig Wr*ght circus has gone on far too long.

It’s bad enough that I’m embarrassed of his behavior from well over a thousand miles away while having nothing to do with him besides also being a member of the Homo sapiens species, but the whole situation is bad for open source software in general.

https://bitcoindefense.org/bitcoin-legal-defense-fund-statement-on-uk-appellate-court-ruling/

I was briefly super worried about future quantum computing advancements allowing anyone to spend anyone else’s bitcoins by breaking elliptic curve cryptography, but then I learned that when output addresses are hashed, the public key corresponding to the spender’s private key isn’t known, so they can’t be spent. So in the worst case scenario everyone with active bitcoin could move it into hashed addresses with public keys never revealed. I THINK this means avoiding address reuse keeps you safe, but I’m not sure how the public keys work for Hierarchical Deterministic wallets work. Can anyone confirm?

We still need quantum resistant cryptography, preferably with a soft fork if that’s possible, to make Bitcoin fulfill Saylor’s claim of teleporting a billion dollars of value a thousand years into the future.

Replying to ff8b6e10...

I’m going to start by saying I assume I’m ignorant, naive, making bad assumptions, or just being dumb. I’m probably wrong and I hope I am.

Can someone explain how the the #fedimint decentralization model is supposed to resist coercion or threats of violence? Because I don’t get it

Apologies if this comes across as a straw man, but my understanding of it is that in the fedimint paradigm:

1. It will only be safe to join a fedimint that’s local (and therefore subject to “Proof of fist” if they try to rug you)

2. It will only be safe to join a fedimint run by people you know personally

3. Fedimints an are envisioned to serve as tools for onboarding and scaling small rural communities, especially in the global south.

Now let’s say there’s a remote town of 500 people, and 5 people run the mint for that town. Everyone in the town who uses the mint (which is almost everyone) knows who those 5 people are and more or less where they live and that they hold the keys for most of the community’s BTC. This is necessary for proof of fist and the threat of social censure in the case of bad behavior.

What stops some warlord or bandit group or dictator from just showing up with AK47s, coercing the names of the mint runners from the first few people they encountered, and then kicking down their doors and demanding the bitcoin at gunpoint? If it were rural America, then the citizens would have the guns to defend themselves, but that isn’t the case in most places. If it was in America, then the citizens would have some confidence that the government wouldn’t use outright violent coercion to discover the names of the mint runners or seize the mint’s bitcoin. There would be some rule of law in place. But again, most people don’t have such assurances or rights.

So that’s my question/ skepticism:

How does fedimint work to protect people’s (that is, a community’s) bitcoin in places where property rights and rule of law are more suggestions than anything else?

I want it to work, I just see it being pretty fragile against violent coercion IF IT’S LOCAL and IF the mint runners are PERSONALLY KNOWN to the mint users.

This is something I’ve heard very little discussion of. I hope there’s a good answer because my understanding is that fedimint was conceptualized by people focused on the global south, so they should have some idea of the challenges faced, but I just don’t understand how a mint is supposed to be resistant to violence when the runners are easily identified and located.

When I originally wrote this, I was making several egregious bad assumptions:

1. “Fedimint has to work for all people in all places at all times or it’s pointless.” This is obviously false, but somehow I fell into this thinking. In particular, I fell into the same trap that the YouTuber “Technology Connections” bemoans about people objecting to installing heat pump heating systems: “Good enough MOST OF THE TIME is GOOD ENOUGH, MOST OF THE TIME.” Lots of people object to heat pumps because there will be 1-5 days out of the winter where a traditional furnace will be needed, completely ignoring the benefits for the rest of the winter. If 40% or even 20% of the global south can onboard and scale with fedimint, that’s an absolute win.

2. I was assuming that resources put into developing fedimint are in a zero sum game with other “scaling to billions” solutions, so I was worried we were collectively betting on the wrong scaling horse. Not only is that not necessarily true, it’s likely to be false because more development and infrastructure build-out in the space is only going to draw more attention from other developers, who will each individually gravitate towards the most compelling projects for them personally. So it all works out.

TLDR

I was worried and cranky about #Fedimint not being the be-all, end all solution to global scaling, but it doesn’t need to be.

Replying to ff8b6e10...

I’m going to start by saying I assume I’m ignorant, naive, making bad assumptions, or just being dumb. I’m probably wrong and I hope I am.

Can someone explain how the the #fedimint decentralization model is supposed to resist coercion or threats of violence? Because I don’t get it

Apologies if this comes across as a straw man, but my understanding of it is that in the fedimint paradigm:

1. It will only be safe to join a fedimint that’s local (and therefore subject to “Proof of fist” if they try to rug you)

2. It will only be safe to join a fedimint run by people you know personally

3. Fedimints an are envisioned to serve as tools for onboarding and scaling small rural communities, especially in the global south.

Now let’s say there’s a remote town of 500 people, and 5 people run the mint for that town. Everyone in the town who uses the mint (which is almost everyone) knows who those 5 people are and more or less where they live and that they hold the keys for most of the community’s BTC. This is necessary for proof of fist and the threat of social censure in the case of bad behavior.

What stops some warlord or bandit group or dictator from just showing up with AK47s, coercing the names of the mint runners from the first few people they encountered, and then kicking down their doors and demanding the bitcoin at gunpoint? If it were rural America, then the citizens would have the guns to defend themselves, but that isn’t the case in most places. If it was in America, then the citizens would have some confidence that the government wouldn’t use outright violent coercion to discover the names of the mint runners or seize the mint’s bitcoin. There would be some rule of law in place. But again, most people don’t have such assurances or rights.

So that’s my question/ skepticism:

How does fedimint work to protect people’s (that is, a community’s) bitcoin in places where property rights and rule of law are more suggestions than anything else?

I want it to work, I just see it being pretty fragile against violent coercion IF IT’S LOCAL and IF the mint runners are PERSONALLY KNOWN to the mint users.

This is something I’ve heard very little discussion of. I hope there’s a good answer because my understanding is that fedimint was conceptualized by people focused on the global south, so they should have some idea of the challenges faced, but I just don’t understand how a mint is supposed to be resistant to violence when the runners are easily identified and located.

Sorry for the double post. Please comment on the other post instead to keep the conversation consolidated.

Replying to ff8b6e10...

I’m going to start by saying I assume I’m ignorant, naive, making bad assumptions, or just being dumb. I’m probably wrong and I hope I am.

Can someone explain how the the #fedimint decentralization model is supposed to resist coercion or threats of violence? Because I don’t get it

Apologies if this comes across as a straw man, but my understanding of it is that in the fedimint paradigm:

1. It will only be safe to join a fedimint that’s local (and therefore subject to “Proof of fist” if they try to rug you)

2. It will only be safe to join a fedimint run by people you know personally

3. Fedimints an are envisioned to serve as tools for onboarding and scaling small rural communities, especially in the global south.

Now let’s say there’s a remote town of 500 people, and 5 people run the mint for that town. Everyone in the town who uses the mint (which is almost everyone) knows who those 5 people are and more or less where they live and that they hold the keys for most of the community’s BTC. This is necessary for proof of fist and the threat of social censure in the case of bad behavior.

What stops some warlord or bandit group or dictator from just showing up with AK47s, coercing the names of the mint runners from the first few people they encountered, and then kicking down their doors and demanding the bitcoin at gunpoint? If it were rural America, then the citizens would have the guns to defend themselves, but that isn’t the case in most places. If it was in America, then the citizens would have some confidence that the government wouldn’t use outright violent coercion to discover the names of the mint runners or seize the mint’s bitcoin. There would be some rule of law in place. But again, most people don’t have such assurances or rights.

So that’s my question/ skepticism:

How does fedimint work to protect people’s (that is, a community’s) bitcoin in places where property rights and rule of law are more suggestions than anything else?

I want it to work, I just see it being pretty fragile against violent coercion IF IT’S LOCAL and IF the mint runners are PERSONALLY KNOWN to the mint users.

This is something I’ve heard very little discussion of. I hope there’s a good answer because my understanding is that fedimint was conceptualized by people focused on the global south, so they should have some idea of the challenges faced, but I just don’t understand how a mint is supposed to be resistant to violence when the runners are easily identified and located.

In other words:

How is an unarmed community of #fedimint users supposed to resist armed robbery of the entire community at once when the armed robbers equal or outnumber the mint runners?

It seems like fedimint just creates a slightly more complicated honeypot, but not complicated enough to discourage determined attackers.

I’m going to start by saying I assume I’m ignorant, naive, making bad assumptions, or just being dumb. I’m probably wrong and I hope I am.

Can someone explain how the the #fedimint decentralization model is supposed to resist coercion or threats of violence? Because I don’t get it

Apologies if this comes across as a straw man, but my understanding of it is that in the fedimint paradigm:

1. It will only be safe to join a fedimint that’s local (and therefore subject to “Proof of fist” if they try to rug you)

2. It will only be safe to join a fedimint run by people you know personally

3. Fedimints an are envisioned to serve as tools for onboarding and scaling small rural communities, especially in the global south.

Now let’s say there’s a remote town of 500 people, and 5 people run the mint for that town. Everyone in the town who uses the mint (which is almost everyone) knows who those 5 people are and more or less where they live and that they hold the keys for most of the community’s BTC. This is necessary for proof of fist and the threat of social censure in the case of bad behavior.

What stops some warlord or bandit group or dictator from just showing up with AK47s, coercing the names of the mint runners from the first few people they encountered, and then kicking down their doors and demanding the bitcoin at gunpoint? If it were rural America, then the citizens would have the guns to defend themselves, but that isn’t the case in most places. If it was in America, then the citizens would have some confidence that the government wouldn’t use outright violent coercion to discover the names of the mint runners or seize the mint’s bitcoin. There would be some rule of law in place. But again, most people don’t have such assurances or rights.

So that’s my question/ skepticism:

How does fedimint work to protect people’s (that is, a community’s) bitcoin in places where property rights and rule of law are more suggestions than anything else?

I want it to work, I just see it being pretty fragile against violent coercion IF IT’S LOCAL and IF the mint runners are PERSONALLY KNOWN to the mint users.

This is something I’ve heard very little discussion of. I hope there’s a good answer because my understanding is that fedimint was conceptualized by people focused on the global south, so they should have some idea of the challenges faced, but I just don’t understand how a mint is supposed to be resistant to violence when the runners are easily identified and located.