Replying to Avatar The Stacker Monster

I don't really have a problem with grapheneOS that calyx would solve. It would probably just make things worse.

My main issues are:

1) I am used to the iOS environment more than android

2) 95%+ of my contacts use iPhones so I can securely message with iMessage, only a quarter of them use signal. By using graphene, I end up with insecure/unencrypted SMS messaging with my contacts

3) I do not use icloud, i don't use siri, i use lockdown mode. I feel like with those settings, I have a setup that is probably equally as secure as graphene with some (but hard for me to quantify) privacy tradeoff since apple is probably still collecting a bunch of data on me
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GrapheneOS 9mo ago

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GrapheneOS does provide better real world protection against exploits than you have with that iOS configuration, and better overall privacy.

Here's a real world example:

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/14344-cellebrite-premium-july-2024-documentation

https://osservatorionessuno.org/blog/2025/03/a-deep-dive-into-cellebrite-android-support-as-of-february-2025/

iOS can be consistently exploited by these tools even with lockdown mode.

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The Stacker Monster 9mo ago

I appreciate the extra info!

My threat model does not really include someone physically taking my device. I am mainly wanting privacy from big tech companies.

So having e2ee messaging by default that the SIM providers cannot read (via imessage) is a huge benefit to me that I would lose by messaging the vast majority of people I know with iPhones who do not use signal as I would have to use regular old sms.