nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqwq8aszhx3cqfa5af0j2z6fnwxhu2fg3xcuy6m3ph4ut2hrg957fszth9ey nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqsg6plzptd64u62a878hep2kev88swjh3tw00gjsfl8f237lmu63qnace4v nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq7swfhy6znrp5r29wwu9k6jd8mkas9060ak4mjf3enzekdq2znpdqhwureq
GrapheneOS does provide better real world protection against exploits than you have with that iOS configuration, and better overall privacy.
Here's a real world example:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/14344-cellebrite-premium-july-2024-documentation
iOS can be consistently exploited by these tools even with lockdown mode.
I appreciate the extra info!
My threat model does not really include someone physically taking my device. I am mainly wanting privacy from big tech companies.
So having e2ee messaging by default that the SIM providers cannot read (via imessage) is a huge benefit to me that I would lose by messaging the vast majority of people I know with iPhones who do not use signal as I would have to use regular old sms.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqwq8aszhx3cqfa5af0j2z6fnwxhu2fg3xcuy6m3ph4ut2hrg957fszth9ey nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqsg6plzptd64u62a878hep2kev88swjh3tw00gjsfl8f237lmu63qnace4v nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq7swfhy6znrp5r29wwu9k6jd8mkas9060ak4mjf3enzekdq2znpdqhwureq You'll be able to have that once Apple ships RCS encryption though, and we'll both make Google Messages easier to set up in the short term along with beginning or sponsoring work to make an independent RCS messaging app with end-to-end encryption support which is much more work than just RCS.
