nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyz0swfn7l0ls333cagdfs2nzafm7zyjx8qwfjkgk7pyrthy07ufky4dukey nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyzkyfmjjmzdxt6mytz5csztyq5vgxel2s80vl96yx0esy6z4ghy0urpn2xw nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyzssg8zfge52mqracsvp2hcypjhdfsq2ypql0l2wydd493wac28ejrsw995 /e/ always connects to Google services and gives Google services a highly privileged status. It does not avoid them.
Privacy and security will be much better with an iPhone and iCloud with Advanced Data Protection. The direct comparison to /e/ sending speech data to OpenAI is Apple handling it locally, which is the approach we've taken for what we'll be launching soon.
/e/ lacks the bare minimum of essential privacy and security patches so it's never a safe option.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyz0swfn7l0ls333cagdfs2nzafm7zyjx8qwfjkgk7pyrthy07ufky4dukey nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyzkyfmjjmzdxt6mytz5csztyq5vgxel2s80vl96yx0esy6z4ghy0urpn2xw nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyzssg8zfge52mqracsvp2hcypjhdfsq2ypql0l2wydd493wac28ejrsw995 Murena's products and services are extraordinary insecure and non-private. They do not ship basic privacy/security patches and mislead users about it. They include user tracking and send user data to third parties like OpenAI without consent. People are far better off for both privacy and security with an iPhone. /e/ is unsafe and not fit for purpose as a general computing device.
/e/ is not easier than GrapheneOS. It has far worse stability and app compatibility.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyqv5fyddadla3j8vqq2tpc4zxdm8gjcx7jl3vpm62tulz5k3yu8hvyya09s Phreeli is nothing more than a T-Mobile MVNO which claims to avoid tying subscriptions to cellular service in an identifiable way. It makes more sense to use https://silent.link/ which doesn't use a subscription but rather is a $9 flat fee with reasonably priced pay-as-you-go data rates. You can combine it with a VOIP service if you want traditional calls/text rather than their SMS plan.
Cape has their own infrastructure and unique identifier rotation features they're building out.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqypm604r8485qp6c79uztjrkdc9s3muct2052gyqxrmed5vun030lg7wr54z Defending ourselves from attacks with factual information isn't aggression. The people making these attacks including libel, bullying and harassment content towards our team are the aggressive and toxic ones. You can see it happening with no moderator intervention in the linked forum thread being used to brigade threads on Mastodon. It's not the first time.
If you see the fake story about someone claiming to be charged with premeditated murder because GrapheneOS supposedly didn't protect their data, see https://nitter.net/GrapheneOS/status/1997126386968903972 for a thorough debunking. Their story keeps changing and clearly isn't real. They may be a career criminal but this is fake.
Android 16 QPR2 experimental releases will be available soon. We're dealing with a lot of attacks on the project branching off from the smear campaign in France. We'd appreciate if our community would debunk this nonsense across platforms for us so we can focus on QPR2. Thanks.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyqtp9sqsqf8q9p6ps2amhjkeeje63x4qejk9pu9f6ejz9325hhe36cn595a nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyzcjjatxf5sy0nc2lcj80nf8t9ha5rza42x59axeqmwyxsqts39wkyc3edv It also does a similar thing for apps using Google Play via the SDK. For example, it intercepts calls to the location API and reimplements their location API with the OS location API directly from the app using it. It does NOT send the app's Google Play location requests to another service implementing that like microG does which would then need to correctly implement the permission checks, etc. It implements the redirection to the OS API within the apps using it.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyqtp9sqsqf8q9p6ps2amhjkeeje63x4qejk9pu9f6ejz9325hhe36cn595a nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyzcjjatxf5sy0nc2lcj80nf8t9ha5rza42x59axeqmwyxsqts39wkyc3edv You're wrong, it's nearly the entirety of how the sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer is implemented. The compatibility layer code runs almost entirely inside of the Google Play apps and apps using them. The whole point of the compatibility layer is that it's implemented through using the APIs available to a sandboxed app from within the app sandbox. It doesn't provide any special privileges but rather changes how the apps do things.
GrapheneOS version 2025120400 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2025120400
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/28697-grapheneos-version-2025120400-released
#GrapheneOS #privacy #security
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyr4pu6f32qtgsunfgs6xc3gd54699dl0cfh5j290fgwtlclfvdm2unclh8v nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqypvuhpdp3x8hwq32kpmstye55k9z6nv3mpthusvavdyfsr5r422fg3rcmfh Verified boot is a very small part of why mobile devices with iOS/AOSP are more secure than traditional desktop operating systems and hardware. Verified boot is useful far beyond physical attack vector such as preventing privileged attacker persistence. It's a misconception that it's only useful against physical attacks. The Windows and desktop Linux ecosystem secure boot is incomplete both prior to the OS and for the OS. It doesn't provide the expected benefits.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyr4pu6f32qtgsunfgs6xc3gd54699dl0cfh5j290fgwtlclfvdm2unclh8v nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqypvuhpdp3x8hwq32kpmstye55k9z6nv3mpthusvavdyfsr5r422fg3rcmfh iOS and the Android Open Source project are far more private and secure than traditional desktop operating systems. Every user installed application is sandboxed with a far better permission model than rare sandbox usage on desktops, there are much more modern exploit protections, far more code is written in memory safe languages especially for Android, there's far less attack surface and far more work on systemic privacy/security such as MAC/MLS policies and more.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyp2h3kldpc5dytapynjwg8rwfcmhsclduzrrkq7r7vac5mnrgudn5s8tr9g nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyrj009gjpd2xtwzttpt49rssf33rccfvpc8wpet9tt3lm286p9mgvd6rg76 nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyqkxs8sjntj93fv6n7qn5ynezedesrplp3ygkjng5xl0w0g9jm7akt7uymw Multiple of Braxman's products and services are proven by security researchers to contain backdoors including fake end-to-end encryption providing keys to the server.
/e/ and iodéOS both claim to provide privacy/security patches they do not and set an inaccurate Android security patch level. The mislead users about how little their DNS filtering does for privacy from apps and bogus labels on apps.
See https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-privacysecurity-patches-and-protections-arent-private and the linked third party content.
A false narrative is being pushed about GrapheneOS claiming we're ending operations in France due to the actions of 2 newspapers. That's completely wrong. If both newspapers and the overall French media had taken our side instead of extreme bias against us, we'd still be leaving.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyrj009gjpd2xtwzttpt49rssf33rccfvpc8wpet9tt3lm286p9mgvd6rg76 nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyqkxs8sjntj93fv6n7qn5ynezedesrplp3ygkjng5xl0w0g9jm7akt7uymw The context is important especially the references to SkyECC and Encrochat. They've made it clear they think we should providing them access and are demanding cooperation. They're also inaccurately conflating GrapheneOS with other things and talking about features, distribution and marketing it doesn't have. It's quite clear to us that it's not safe to operate in France or with French services. There are a huge amount of quotes attacking us from her across news sites.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqypdgp2v4lrd703al63ch8egvu006lzez37hxf8ltc8j60lz7pcmk62gehsu nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyqkxs8sjntj93fv6n7qn5ynezedesrplp3ygkjng5xl0w0g9jm7akt7uymw This libel and harassment has been ongoing since long before recent state attacks.
There's someone there linking harassment content filled with blatant lies while claiming there's no harassment. It's ridiculous and it's time for them to stop.
Look through the links we gave and search for it. https://archive.is/UrlvK has a clear threat, as do numerous other quotes across media platforms French authorities went to with this. It's clearly not made up no matter the lies.
It's not possible for GrapheneOS to produce an update for French law enforcement to bypass brute force protection since it's implemented via the secure element (SE). SE also only accepts correctly signed firmware with a greater version AFTER the Owner user unlocks successfully.
We were likely going to be able to release experimental Pixel 10 support very soon and it's getting disrupted. The attacks on our team with ongoing libel and harassment have escalated, raids on our chat rooms have escalated and more. It's rough right now and support is appreciated.
We no longer have any active servers in France and are continuing the process of leaving OVH. We'll be rotating our TLS keys and Let's Encrypt account keys pinned via accounturi. DNSSEC keys may also be rotated. Our backups are encrypted and can remain on OVH for now.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyr8ytksx4npuqqwaunuahrd0jg8xyaxcl2dsu6jc5yn006wxfrdp7uvh3j0 nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyqkxs8sjntj93fv6n7qn5ynezedesrplp3ygkjng5xl0w0g9jm7akt7uymw See https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-privacysecurity-patches-and-protections-arent-private including the linked third party sources from Divested Computing, Mike Kuketz and others.
/e/ and Fairphone have atrocious security. They provide far weak protection against commercial exploit tools than iPhones. It entirely fits with what the French government wants. They either want devices to have poor security where they can break into them very easily or to provide backdoors in the encryption and for remote/physical device access.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyr8ytksx4npuqqwaunuahrd0jg8xyaxcl2dsu6jc5yn006wxfrdp7uvh3j0 nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyqkxs8sjntj93fv6n7qn5ynezedesrplp3ygkjng5xl0w0g9jm7akt7uymw France won't tolerate devices with a reasonable level of security where they can't use widely available off-the-shelf tools to extract data from them. GrapheneOS has massive privacy and security improvements planned.
France's law enforcement sent out memos to all their police telling them to suspect Pixel phones and to give those special treatment due to GrapheneOS existing. Most of what they're talking about is clearly not even GrapheneOS but closed source forks...
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyr8ytksx4npuqqwaunuahrd0jg8xyaxcl2dsu6jc5yn006wxfrdp7uvh3j0 nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyqkxs8sjntj93fv6n7qn5ynezedesrplp3ygkjng5xl0w0g9jm7akt7uymw See https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-privacysecurity-patches-and-protections-arent-private including the linked third party sources from Divested Computing, Mike Kuketz and others.
/e/ and Fairphone have atrocious security. They provide far weak protection against commercial exploit tools than iPhones. It entirely fits with what the French government wants. They either want devices to have poor security where they can break into them very easily or to provide backdoors in the encryption and for remote/physical device access.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqypg4j433detx3uclc8mrg9fe739zrdvaflcprgzj4zpnv6ec8rvzqzt6xa2 It's a lot better overall than it was before including a lot of useful added functionality. You can now have 4 quick tiles per row instead of only 2. Try resetting the quick tile layout to the new default at the bottom of the quick tile editor or resizing them manually. The battery display is a lot more visible than before which makes it more accessible. People may not like all of the new aesthetics but will get used to it. Do you dislike any functionality changes in it?
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyrdh42k6lh9cw2q4x0kjf0u2qh4xvsua4jlayn4je4jus8g83hj7g4gd89y nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyrtucy0qzk4pgcqdtsw9uvmx5uwqcdtvkvlgp8a5gesyxve0mml07t3y4mr These are the main 3 articles with the misinformation and threats from French law enforcement:
The 2nd newspaper was more balanced than the 1st. There's a lot of coverage elsewhere now and a lot of that is more positive. It's not how the media covers it which matters though. We got the message that French law enforcement is enraged by people having secure devices and expects backdoors, so we're leaving.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyrdh42k6lh9cw2q4x0kjf0u2qh4xvsua4jlayn4je4jus8g83hj7g4gd89y nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyrtucy0qzk4pgcqdtsw9uvmx5uwqcdtvkvlgp8a5gesyxve0mml07t3y4mr There were 2 articles from Le Parisien. One contains a bunch of misinformation about GrapheneOS from a French national law enforcement agency and the other contains and explicit threats towards us. They threaten to do what they did with SkyECC and Encrochat which are nothing like us. OVH was involved in both of those things. They imply that it will be their action if we do not include backdoors, which appears to be what they mean by 'cooperate' since we don't have user data.
Please listen to this podcast about ANOM:
https://darknetdiaries.com/transcript/146/
The FBI ran a string operation in Europe where they created their own 'secure' phone and messaging platform. Their OS used portions of our code and was heavily marketed as being GrapheneOS or based on GrapheneOS.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqypvuhpdp3x8hwq32kpmstye55k9z6nv3mpthusvavdyfsr5r422fg3rcmfh Braxman is a charlatan who sells fake privacy products and services. His products and services are proven to include actual backdoors including fake end-to-end encryption by privacy/security researchers. His content is filled with serial fabricators about the topics he covers including the video you linked. It has egregiously false claims about the GrapheneOS project aimed at marketing his highly bottom of the barrel MediaTek phones with an ancient AOSP fork missing basic patches.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqypd29urh2tfsp9p58rtyd4r4q8crmsr9xf7ul5zxp2k3x2rccp88j3ltnwy We aren't partnered with Nothing. This is going to confuse people and you should remove it.
Releases of GrapheneOS based on Android 16 QPR1 are available for public testing. These are highly experimental and aren't being pushed out via the Alpha channel yet. Join our testing chat room if you have a spare device you can use to help with testing.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyplvuz887jmztehgzn232wqw0tgdt0q2cswqavcpr6339wtecuup7jseqff There are no Pixel Update Bulletin security patches for November 2025:
https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/pixel/2025-11-01
They skipped the November 2025 release for the Pixel 6, Pixel 6 Pro, Pixel 6a, Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro since the 2 patches listed for the Android Security Bulletin were shipped by both the stock Pixel OS and GrapheneOS in September 2025 as part of the patches listed in the partner preview for September 2025 but deferred to being listed until a future month, which regularly happens.
nostr:nprofile1qyt8wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnyd968gmewwp6kytcqyplvuz887jmztehgzn232wqw0tgdt0q2cswqavcpr6339wtecuup7jseqff GrapheneOS will be moving to Android 16 QPR1 which was released to AOSP on November 11th. We'll be using the new Pixel firmware/drivers too but there are essentially no changes this month. There aren't even carrier configuration changes this, the update barely exists at all. It's Android 16 QPR1 finally being pushed to AOSP which matters and we're heavily working on the porting process.
Google recently made incredibly misguided changes to Android security updates. Android security patches are almost entirely quarterly instead of monthly to make it easier for OEMs. They're giving OEMs 3-4 months of early access which we know for a fact is being widely leaked including to attackers.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqhfg3tsmmp7g3u5cw6mzg0n9andehmgel6jug486eppsr0rqx4a3qrq08dv nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqrxysxnjkhrmqd3ey73dp9n5y5yvyzcs64acc9g0k2epcpwwyya4sadxs9s nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqzqpplr6amrmfn6fn8pue09rmslg4d6m623nzslwd6utd6s78p3qql9eh8f CalyxOS is a highly insecure and non-private OS which doesn't even provide the 2025-06-05 security patch level or above. The only additional devices it runs on are insecure ones without standard privacy/security patches and security features. CalyxOS is discontinued anyway: https://calyxos.org/news/2025/08/01/a-letter-to-our-community/.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq9ycnejg85q2mc2t2l6c24ddrjscxm0x69tpftzc8jqeu4f4lz40q3n9593 They're no less dependent on AOSP than GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS is actively working with a far larger OEM towards future devices meeting our requirements and providing official GrapheneOS support.
Fairphone's devices are made by an ODM for them. They have very little involvement in either the hardware or software. Their devices have atrocious privacy and security:
They can't keep up with basic updates.
It's much too early to ask us when we'll have support for the new Pixel 10 phones. They're only available for preorder. We need to have access to the devices and factory images before we can start working on this. If the new Pixels still provide proper alternate OS support, we can support them.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqghcetnluhryhynhuyj8s2pazldjm27wl40nu6dfeskvpv09twcns0c4teu nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq6jknkmh2luflurx2epkj99qyj7v2ut3ew7t2mfd7xxt9jtjku2nswter9c The keyboard is simply a lightly modified AOSP Keyboard, which resembles Google Keyboard from 2015. You can use whatever keyboard you prefer since they'll all work fine on GrapheneOS.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqsy70twa0vadtk8hjs6wt2hmfszduj04tw78ccs3ktmr9u99mfmqswmmn83 nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqhxx76n82ags8jrduk0p3gqrfyqyaxnrlnynu9p5rt2vmwjq6ts3qf3easn nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqclk6vc9xhjp8q5cws262wuf2eh4zuvwupft03hy4ttqqnm7e0jrqdasl9j nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqwf4pufsucer5va8g9p0rj5dnhvfeh6d8w0g6eayaep5dhps6rsgsfsutnj nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqeaz6dwsnvwkha5sn5puwwyxjgy26uusundrm684lg3vw4ma5c2jsuujmv4 See https://grapheneos.org/faq#recommended-devices for our recommendations. We're working with an OEM towards their devices supporting GrapheneOS but that's a year or two away in the future.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqmarc26z8nh3xkj5rcx7ufkatvx6ueqhp5vfw9v5teq26z254renst2cjvc nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqeaz6dwsnvwkha5sn5puwwyxjgy26uusundrm684lg3vw4ma5c2jsuujmv4 nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqwf4pufsucer5va8g9p0rj5dnhvfeh6d8w0g6eayaep5dhps6rsgsfsutnj nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqhxx76n82ags8jrduk0p3gqrfyqyaxnrlnynu9p5rt2vmwjq6ts3qf3easn nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqclk6vc9xhjp8q5cws262wuf2eh4zuvwupft03hy4ttqqnm7e0jrqdasl9j Recommend the high quality comparison between alternate operating systems at https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm. You should also read https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24791-departure-of-calyx-calyxos-leadership-and-discontinuation-of-calyxos-updates in case you're unaware.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqm5s9w4t03znyetxswhgq0ud7fq8ef8y3l4kscn2e8wkvmv42hh3qqne3mx nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqkl8e7s48j6cfr6zrmn53n5l0fsxustszj3fwmu9ahn0tnm9e8euqmwdfch nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqm2mvvpjugwdehtaskrcl7ksvdqnnhnjur9v6g9v266nss504q7mqs7jy9j nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq4slk4lshtylkrqg9z0dvng09gn58h88frvnax7uga3v0h25szj4q7n6hfd You can see from the high quality third party comparison at https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm other Android-based OSes are far different and not focused on privacy and security in the same way. That's why they support devices with poor security.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqm5s9w4t03znyetxswhgq0ud7fq8ef8y3l4kscn2e8wkvmv42hh3qqne3mx nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqkl8e7s48j6cfr6zrmn53n5l0fsxustszj3fwmu9ahn0tnm9e8euqmwdfch nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqm2mvvpjugwdehtaskrcl7ksvdqnnhnjur9v6g9v266nss504q7mqs7jy9j nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq4slk4lshtylkrqg9z0dvng09gn58h88frvnax7uga3v0h25szj4q7n6hfd GrapheneOS only supports Pixels because Pixels are currently the only devices where an alternate OS can provide a high level of security. Other devices with the listed security features don't allow another OS either at all or securely.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqm5s9w4t03znyetxswhgq0ud7fq8ef8y3l4kscn2e8wkvmv42hh3qqne3mx nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqkl8e7s48j6cfr6zrmn53n5l0fsxustszj3fwmu9ahn0tnm9e8euqmwdfch nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqm2mvvpjugwdehtaskrcl7ksvdqnnhnjur9v6g9v266nss504q7mqs7jy9j nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq4slk4lshtylkrqg9z0dvng09gn58h88frvnax7uga3v0h25szj4q7n6hfd You can see from the high quality third party comparison at https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm other Android-based OSes are far different and not focused on privacy and security in the same way. That's why they support devices with poor security.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqm5s9w4t03znyetxswhgq0ud7fq8ef8y3l4kscn2e8wkvmv42hh3qqne3mx nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqkl8e7s48j6cfr6zrmn53n5l0fsxustszj3fwmu9ahn0tnm9e8euqmwdfch nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqm2mvvpjugwdehtaskrcl7ksvdqnnhnjur9v6g9v266nss504q7mqs7jy9j nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq4slk4lshtylkrqg9z0dvng09gn58h88frvnax7uga3v0h25szj4q7n6hfd Pixels are currently the only devices meeting the very reasonable and important security requirements we have listed at https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices. It's not possible to provide something comparable to what we do on other devices yet.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqfkluklzamwpyn7w8awxzrcqe7z8mldlvthk4gz9kz3vsh6udz62seprkrg nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq0r8xl2njyepcw2zwv3a6dyufj4e4ajx86hz6v4ehu4gnpupxxp7shn6f9s nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqam3ermkr250dywukzqnaug64cred3x5jht6f3kdhfp3h0rgtjlpq9ehqgf nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq2vkcxr0luzwp8e673v29eqjhrr7p9vqq8asav85swaepclllj09sc7slvl nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqkvaln6tm0re4d99q9e4ma788wpvnw0jzkz595cljtfgwhldd75xswy64xm nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqadnnfrsjn7tlhqlkyptkgdpdv9958575gra3s2s7puzppkkrvzfq0k3xad Our posts do come from https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/with_replies but we plan to make a Nostr account for the project soon.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqfkluklzamwpyn7w8awxzrcqe7z8mldlvthk4gz9kz3vsh6udz62seprkrg nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq0r8xl2njyepcw2zwv3a6dyufj4e4ajx86hz6v4ehu4gnpupxxp7shn6f9s nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqam3ermkr250dywukzqnaug64cred3x5jht6f3kdhfp3h0rgtjlpq9ehqgf nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq2vkcxr0luzwp8e673v29eqjhrr7p9vqq8asav85swaepclllj09sc7slvl nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqkvaln6tm0re4d99q9e4ma788wpvnw0jzkz595cljtfgwhldd75xswy64xm nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqadnnfrsjn7tlhqlkyptkgdpdv9958575gra3s2s7puzppkkrvzfq0k3xad Our posts will get bridged both ways and people on both sides will interact with both so it'll be messy.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqwq8aszhx3cqfa5af0j2z6fnwxhu2fg3xcuy6m3ph4ut2hrg957fszth9ey nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq0r8xl2njyepcw2zwv3a6dyufj4e4ajx86hz6v4ehu4gnpupxxp7shn6f9s nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqdergggklka99wwrs92yz8wdjs952h2ux2ha2ed598ngwu9w7a6fstyhp90 We haven't looked into it deeply and therefore can't really say much about it yet. When we do look into it, we'll make suggestions so it can be improved.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq6w2fwsaffanj6dpgklnh2hwzhd2fj6s75hj7kdwhldg04hth5e5q6eap9l nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqqmlark5zym2u576hfmecfaa2els8eln4rxls76z24l3g7pq48rvqk92wc8 nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpque3newe9950rhx3efyfxrq8pv5m09n85y8ywc4vsc98gwyuzl7ysy08qq0 It's normal for Signal to drain lots of battery if it's using their own push instead of FCM via sandboxed Play services. If you installed Signal before Play services, it will use their own push. If it's shown as an active app meaning running a foreground service, it's using their own push. It's quite possible the battery estimates became more accurate in Android 16.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq8ztv8tq3g3ez9yvlsf0madcytjm48cg78ezyhwal3xyg39rc45zsylusgf Fairphone doesn't provide proper updates or security features. Their devices don't meet our basic hardware security and support requirements which are listed at https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices. They ship the yearly releases around a year late from the start, skip monthly/quarterly releases entirely and consistently ship the security backports and SoC driver/firmware patches 1-2 months late. They have no secure element which is essential for disk encryption and important for other features.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq8ztv8tq3g3ez9yvlsf0madcytjm48cg78ezyhwal3xyg39rc45zsylusgf
> With Google’s recent announcement that they will no longer be providing device trees for Pixel phones
There's no other Android OEM providing what Pixels provided prior to Android 16. It was never one of our hardware requirements and we've continued supporting Pixels without it. We've communicated that GrapheneOS development will continue, that existing Pixels will remain supported until end-of-life and that future Pixels will be supported if they meet the hardware requirements.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpq4a9l56mdqa59xvyyanah6kfanr32rvu2mfa92em8qwgvf4w7x7eqhg0662 nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqzq376kdzkvsdt0p49zemr505ctmnsc4383g50z9ml5q2rk74a54q3pc8fx nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqxtscya34g58tk0z605fvr788k263gsu6cy9x0mhnm87echrgufzs9d84s8 They're a major Android OEM. As long as it works out, you'll see why it makes sense.
iPhones have good overall privacy and security but Apple does collect telemetry, forces people to have accounts and knows which apps each user/device has installed. They do not have magical privacy and security properties. An app like this claiming iOS gives them 100% anonymity is very strange.
nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqd5xyamzv8pp8h2uphlhjnxtjqnwsv49txc2vay8w86vrns9ywqyq3ujuc5 You can use Fedora for both the web installer or CLI install. Last time we checked, it didn't have the udev rules packaged and we didn't want to add more instructions to work around desktop Linux usability issues. We have enough workarounds for problems caused by operating system deficiencies and really don't want to add manual udev rule installation instructions or explain how to use a third party repository for it.
Our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer is open source code shipped as part of GrapheneOS which enables optionally installing and running Google apps as regular apps in the standard app sandbox without any special access, control or privileged integration into the OS.