Libertarian legal theory prioritizes procedural consistency over outcomes. Even if the evidence is factually true, its acquisition through coercion invalidates its use in a justice process. To accept such evidence would imply that aggression can be a legitimate tool for uncovering truth, opening a dangerous precedent where anyone could trespass or violate rights "for the greater good."
nostr:nprofile1qqst0mtgkp3du662ztj3l4fgts0purksu5fgek5n4vgmg9gt2hkn9lqpzdmhxue69uhhwmm59e6hg7r09ehkuef0qys8wumn8ghj7mn0wd68ytn9d9h82mny0fmkzmn6d9njuumsv93k2tchdvwsu I have a question:
If someone breaks into private property (illegally) and uncovers proof that the owner has stolen property — should that evidence be considered valid in a libertarian legal framework?
Rothbard and Hoppe would argue, no. But this does not make sense to me. What is your viewpoint on that? This is not a deductive objective step anymore it seems to me
Discussion
Okay I still have “buts”:
- aggression would still not be legitimate, as the aggressor would be punished non the less (regardless if he finds eve fence or not
- information (here the evidence) is not scare? and thus no property.
- if the evidence would be uploaded to the internet, third parties would have gotten the information without aggression, and it could then be used legally
Also it feels wrong, but I now feelings are not objectively. But it’s basically saying, the truth does not exist legally.
nostr:nprofile1qqst0mtgkp3du662ztj3l4fgts0purksu5fgek5n4vgmg9gt2hkn9lqpypmhxue69uhkummnw3ezuetfde6kuer6wasku7nfvuh8xurpvdjj7qghwaehxw309aex2mrp0yhxz7n6v9kk7tnwv46z7pxxtmh I think this logic breaks with Kinsellas IP. Example:
A breaks into B’s garage and discovers stolen bicycles. A calls C to inform them about the bicycles.
A: clearly violates property rights
C: however not, he just received information (IP), which he can then use as e wishes. That means C can use it as evidence or clue.
Or would you still disagree here? :)