Good quote.

“This paired with the high likelihood that ION DIDs will almost always be resolved by ION nodes instead of clients/light wallets manually doing what an ION node does for you sort of nullifies / diminishes the censorship resistance provided by the anchor to Bitcoin.”

Thanks Moe.

We cannot rely on a prevalence of honest ION nodes as a form of security because it creates the risk of an ION Sybil attack. The proof a user receives must prove that the URL is not registered to anyone else, like it does in ENS.

Unlike ENS, an ION node could omit previous registrations of a custom URL and deliver valid proofs of a new on-chain registration. This means an attacker could perform URL spoofing on users with a mere ION node Sybil attack and a few bitcoin transactions, unlike the extremely costly 51% attack required for URL spoofing in ENS.

In ENS, full-nodes can’t perform this trick without launching a 51% attack because users receive a Patricia-Merkle proof from full-nodes that verifies the current state of the domain registry. ION trade-offs aren’t worth the risks.