Weren't you Average Bitcoiner before? Might be good to take that on and lie low for a bit while Fiat Gary runs rampant.

MAYBE I SHOULD REBRAND AS "NOT FIAT GARY"

WAIT. WHICH ONE ARE YOU CALLING ME?!?! 😩

'Why did my Windows just do that?' asks one collegue to another.

Me, only listening with half an year and a UNIX brain immediately thought, 'do a dmesg?' ... only to remember that, whilst you can do the equivalent with Event Viewer in Windows, you only do it when you hate yourself enough. xD Sure, dmesg isn't pretty, but at least it is straight to the point. Event Viewer very much is not. o.o

YES, PLEASE. THERE IS ONE THAT IS JUST A SNAIL. YOU WILL BE DISAPPOINTED BY THAT ONE LESS THAN THE GENSLER GARY.

Its unfortunate that this map chose green, purple and yellow/gold colors to depict the bad places that either ban or charge for plastic bags.

How many sats to eat?

ahh come on, everyone loves a kiwi accent. Fush n Chups washed down with L&P anyone?

I'm too old for this new trend of calling everyone "bro". .... Dude. 👵🏾

LLM tokens are the shitcoins of 2024

All we got is this. It’s nasty. 🌧️😑

I remember lugging my CRT to friend’s house. We’d compare who had the nicer CRT 😂 but the real face-off was always in the games. Battlefield, CS, Quake, WoW, Halo, UT.

Yeah, nerdy 😆 nostr:note1p6zc2t4d0g0hdhn7lepwz62j7se37y0qk56cjjfpumy89lwxtwesxhtkwd

Networking in those days was such a bitch.

I remember lugging my CRT to friend’s house. We’d compare who had the nicer CRT 😂 but the real face-off was always in the games. Battlefield, CS, Quake, WoW, Halo, UT.

Yeah, nerdy 😆 nostr:note1p6zc2t4d0g0hdhn7lepwz62j7se37y0qk56cjjfpumy89lwxtwesxhtkwd

How accurate is this? 🤔

I must say I do like the British accents 😂

Thank you for contacting me about Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). As required under the January 2018 reauthorization of Section 702, this statutory authority expired on December 31, 2023, although existing FISA Court-issued specific orders, authorizations or directives remain in effect until the expiration of a given order, authorization or directive. I am closely monitoring discussions surrounding potential reauthorization and appreciate the opportunity to take your thoughts into consideration.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the intelligence community and Federal law enforcement, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), were heavily criticized for failing to connect the dots that could have prevented those attacks. Congress established Section 702 to provide our intelligence and law enforcement professionals with legal authority to collect foreign intelligence critical to national security. Section 702 authorizes the Attorney General of the United States and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence through targeted surveillance of foreign individuals reasonably believed to be outside the United States. Section 702 strictly prohibits targeting U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents, groups substantially composed of U.S. persons and U.S. corporations.

The independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) published its most recent “Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act” on September 28, 2023, and the PCLOB’s policy analysis determined that “…the Section 702 program has been highly valuable in protecting the United States from a wide range of foreign threats, including terrorist attacks in the United States and abroad, cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure, and both conventional and cyber threats posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).” However, the PCLOB also determined that the advantages and unique capabilities of Section 702 also “…poses significant privacy and civil liberties risks, most notably from U.S. person queries and batch queries.”

The PCLOB’s concerns over permissible targeting scope, the definition of “foreign intelligence information” and the lack of codification of the current limited 12 objectives for signals intelligence, align with prior Federal Court findings that found it is impossible to conduct Section 702 targeted foreign intelligence operations of electronic communications without incidentally collecting communications of U.S. persons, such as when an American communicates with a foreign target abroad or discusses a foreign target’s email address or phone number. That is why incidental collection of U.S. electronic communications must be carefully monitored, and proactive safeguards must be preserved, such as ending “abouts” collection, which was appropriate given the absence of any identified mission need for such activities.

I support implementing additional checks and limitations to ensure a more precise collection of a foreign target’s electronic communications. In its September 2023 report, the PCLOB provided Congress with eight thoughtful recommendations that the independent agency believes will preserve Section 702’s highly valuable contributions to national security and counterterrorism operations, while reducing risks of violating privacy rights and civil liberties—and I support carefully considering each of these proposals as Congress seeks to develop a bipartisan Section 702 reauthorization that enables the Federal Government to continue to use the unique capabilities of Section 702 for legitimate foreign intelligence surveillance, while strengthening legal safeguards to prevent abuse and enhancing oversight to hold personnel accountable who violate constitutional, statutory, regulatory or policy requirements or guidance.

Thank you again for taking the time to share your views with me on this challenging issue. This is an important national debate. Many of the concerns you raised are valid and inform my efforts to strengthen oversight and accountability of Section 702 implementation. My constitutional oath requires balancing the concurrent goals of securing the blessings of liberty, while establishing justice, ensuring domestic tranquility and providing for the common defense. Given the FBI Director’s repeated warnings to Congress of the alarming spike in simultaneous elevated threats of terrorism against the United States, I determined the most prudent, though imperfect, course of action was temporarily extending Section 702 statutory authorities to enable Congress to continue debating how best to reauthorize and reform Section 702 without impeding ongoing foreign intelligence collection or counterterrorism operations. While I recognize we may disagree over this balanced approach, please be assured that I will keep your views in mind as I continue working to strengthen oversight and accountability of Section 702 activities moving forward. nostr:note14u3m2l89fvu79k9veseaawahgmpymfq0e6fz2ew8mz7j7plc43qsgry8dh

Scammers running out of money?

I wouldn’t bet on it.

Belcalis Marlenis Almánzar