Subnostr

Joinstr is pretty cool

Replying to

/dev/fd0

I have created a donation page to support my work: donate.joinstr.xyz

This would help me continue to work on joinstr and other projects.

nostr:nevent1qqst8vvgps65d72qf969ap6kmtklauf3nnhm02v2tkw6ymzvtkpe59cpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wd68ytnzv9hxgtczypngzf52eer534q6fn7vrejqqmaexkauxktc9v7evy0kf4guvafdjqcyqqqqqqg5wrs6j

Support Floppy

Replying to

Chuck Langstrumpf

Thanks. Whats the big advantage compared to the platform splitting up the payment? I pay 1000 sats to fountain and they split it up themselves, that way i also do not know how much each creator and the platform gets.

I think that is currently how fountain app does it

There are two possible advantages to doing it atomically, depending on how you do it: you can do it by atomically forwarding the funds to different destinations without telling the sender where the funds end up, which is better for receiver privacy, but allows the "middleman" server to steal by giving the sender an invoice that pays himself, without forwarding the money to the real would-be recipients.

Another way you can do it is, do the same thing except you *do* tell the sender where the funds end up, and include a signature from each recipient confirming that they will only reveal the payment preimage if they get their cut. By doing that, you give up on some of the receiver privacy, because now the sender knows the number of recipients, or at least a number of people who "claim" to be recipients (they could inflate this number), though he still doesn't know what amounts they get.

Whichever way you do it, you additionally break a heuristic that some routing nodes use to guess how much money was received in an LN payment; the heuristic they use is to guess that the ultimate recipient basically receives the full amount sent, minus some routing fees; but if you do an atomic payment split, how much the ultimate recipient gets depends on how the split is done, so the assumption no longer holds.

Replying to

Saberhagen The Nameless

Replace Monero with Lightning in this scenario. How would this have changed anything? It wouldn't have. The problem is obviously with the chokepoints which are the exchange and swap services where they can see this extra data that isn't revealed on the network themselves.

Unless you would define that as "tracing" Lightning too, if so, fair enough but not sure I would agree this was tracing Lightning itself.

I agree that if the admin had done the exact same action with lightning the timing analysis would have worked against lightning too

You may not want to call that tracing but I think it is the accurate term

Replying to

goatmeal

it's not possible for every current and future monero user to cease using monero and take up a convoluted lightning setup. there's not enough room on L1 for them to all perform the necessary channel maintenance steps. there would have to be a blocksize increase, because lightning doesn't scale users. everything that was done to get around this problem results in total loss of sovereignty as well as increasing levels of information leakage.

this is just one of the many reasons why the mass conversion scenario envisioned by super testnet is not actually possible with lightning.

let's start with every current user, it's possible for them to do it

and if they do then perhaps the number of future monero users will be 0

Replying to

nostr:nevent1qqsx8g4raffz9ekh9xj3v80gq72lv3s0qu35vr06d72g9pq3e2zw4rgppemhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mp0qgszrqlfgavys8g0zf8mmy79dn92ghn723wwawx49py0nqjn7jtmjagrqsqqqqqpdps043

i know it can be obnoxious

but my MO is to hash through details publicly so people can see the reasoning behind the analysis

Thank you for doing this

Replying to

wow

its almost like you want to create the impression these issues are unique to monero

cool cool

I don't want to create that impression

To say X is a monero problem is not to say it is *only* a monero problem

The website describes itself as a list of leaks monero has, not a list of leaks that *only* monero has

Replying to

to be clear

you're saying that LE supposedly getting his tx data from the swap service,

which is not part of the evidence but implied for the reasons you gave,

then comparing that to tx data from his exchange account and seeing these close matches constitutes "tracing monero?"

I do claim that, except I disagree with the part that says implications are "not part of the evidence"

Replying to

probably worth noting that this has nothing to do with Monero specifically don't you think?

why do you spin the problems of blockchains as "monero leaks"?

A blockchain problem is a monero problem

Replying to

I believe its a core information theory constraint that you cannot communicate with another entity without revealing some identifying information to them about yourself.

Maybe so, but some information is safer to reveal than others

Option A: the receiver gives the sender a one-time payment string, the sender pays it, and the the receiver irrecoverably discards every trace that he ever had the payment string

Option B: the receiver gives the sender a reusable payment string, the sender pays it, and they both keep the string forever

The latter is worse for privacy because the shared piece of data ties the sender and the recipient together, it stands as an everlasting proof that they interacted. At least one of them should discard it because if it is found on them both, it is evidence that they once interacted. But there is only one way for each to be sure that at least one of them destroyed it: destroy it yourself.

This is not encouraged in monero; on the contrary, the standard contact list feature encourages the sender to keep the receiver's monero address and reuse it, and the standard recommendation for the receiver is never to delete his private keys, because someone might send him money at an old address, not knowing he deleted the keys.

Replying to

The sender knowing where they need to send coins is par for the course. You literally cannot even give me cash or gold or whatever without knowing what my face looks like or what my mailing address is. It's knowing what I do with it after that that matters.

> The sender knowing where they need to send coins is par for the course

Then change course

There's no reason to stick with the poor privacy options of the past, not now that we can do better

It used to be that you could not run a server without disclosing your ip address to your users

Then tor came out and you could run a server as a tor hidden service

It used to be that you could not run a DNM without disclosing your crypto address to your users

Then lightning came out and you can run a DNM as a lightning hidden service

Let's keep pushing and make things ever more private

> It's knowing what I do with it after that that matters

It matters that someone knows your cryptocurrency address. What if they testify in court against you that you gave them that address, and the prosecution demonstrates that it's private key was found on one of your devices? Suddenly it matters. The sender should never learn anything that sensitive.

Replying to

sister_sam

Leaking an address to send monero to? You are most user get fresh addresses to receive on, right? And the transaction is not visible to anyone not directly involved at all. Rather large difference.

Stealth public keys are created continuously NOT a limited supply.

There is no such linkage stealth address and base wallet address that is visible inside a transaction and no transaction visible externally.

And all of this you badly try to make a weakness are part of and partial proofs of the massive privacy advantage of Monero over Bitcoin.

I hope Godzilla is okay

Replying to

You've literally told me that giving someone an address to send coins to and them knowing how much they sent there constitutes tracking.

Mimblewimble doesnt have addresses. Both parties just sign a transaction. Are you a fan of that?

> ...and them knowing how much they sent there

This seems like.highly relevant additional context

Knowing where the coins go sounds very important to the concept of tracking

> MimbleWimble doesn't have addresses

Cool. I don't know much about mimblewimble yet, but that part sounds neat.

Replying to

Super Testnet

> There's no way he genuinely believes that giving someone an address to send to qualifies as tracing

I don't believe that

But I do believe monero would be more private if you did not have to give anyone an address

Every time you have to give someone data, it's a privacy leak

Replying to

They say we shouldn't ascribe motive, but at this point I've seen enough that I, personally, am convinced that it is in bad faith. There's no way he genuinely believes that giving someone an address to send to qualifies as tracing, for example.

> There's no way he genuinely believes that giving someone an address to send to qualifies as tracing

I don't believe that

But I do believe monero would be more private if you did not have to give anyone an address

Replying to

automatic custodial exchange are a thing, no user initiated withdrawal may have been necessary.

but whether user-intitiated or not,

and whether there was an intermediate wallet or not, they nowhere claim to have visibility into any "withdrawal." it is not mentioned at all.

nobody contests there was timing analysis done, but seeing Bitcoin go in and Monero come out isn't "tracing monero."

there is no "monero tracing" when their only monero data point is seeing coins arrive on the CEX.

and if you dont like the word "apprehend", we'll use your word "find".

nowhere do they claim they "found" him by "tracing monero" (as they dont claim to trace monero at all).

so your statement on the case "the DoJ found the admin of Incognito Market by tracing his monero" is a straight up lie.

no tracing, no finding.

you just made all that up to deceive people i guess.

or show me where the FBI says that they first identified him from his Exchange 1 KYC information.

I accept I may have missed that,

but so far it's just you making up more data points that fit your narrative.