Profile: db2f6a66...

Replying to Avatar Michael Matulef

The Use of Knowledge in Society [F.A. Hayek]

https://fountain.fm/episode/12643340106

This is an essential piece diving into the complexities and profound depth in the market establishment of a price. And why the very notion of the price being "wrong" or fixing it, is self-evidently impossible, as the only information we have to make a comparison, is given to us by emerging prices in the market.

#[1]

Qubes is a cool idea, but it isn't enough for me. If it works for you, it's good. But I never want my bare metal touching anything directly. I would suggested a small CLI Tor gateway (like Whonix), and then a few full-blown VMs connecting through it (or NAT, depending).

#[5]

Data can be saved in isolated, encrypted machines. Qubues is a resource hog, and there's no reason to run 20 VMs, really. Two or three dedicated, fully-encrypted VMs can isolate just fine, with more security.

#[6]

The point of isolating VMs is to isolate compromise. It makes no sense to have VMs that are easily identifiable and unencrypted. If a running machine is compromised FDE doesn't help. But isolated encrypted machines with correctly configured permissions do.

#[5]

Too many people think full disk encryption solves everything. It doesn't.

Even possessing unencrypted VMs is a huge attack vector. Plausible deniability should be the first line of defense.

If a VM can't be run in an isolated, encrypted container, it loses 99% of its security.

Two problems with Qubes:

1. Can't run it in an isolated VM. It has to be bare metal. This is a huge problem for plausible deniability.

2. It's own VMs can't be encrypted. If an adversary gains access to the machine, all VMs are compormised.

It's way too vulnerable.