Avatar
ChirpChop
dcdc09a16b128c60ace29c2d4d521fa80bb62db91e69b586bf8e94a467f1cd5f

klimastreig.org

ist nicht erreichbar, sondern gibt einen "ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR"

"404 Page Not Found"

It has for media. For text, you could set "Disappearing messages" to something very small.

1. I _think_ the APK from Signal's site uses (or at least offers and then chooses based on your OS) a different non-Google way of sending you notifications. Not sure, check this again. DO NOT USE APKs from random sites or GitHub repos.

2. I don't know what you are asking exactly.

If you are asking for implications of answers to the first question for the privacy of Signal convos on iPhones (given iPhones are "locked down" (whatever that means?)) then I don't see any but my answer to 1. is uncertain and likely incomplete anyway. Note that surveillance via notification timing analyses has been reported in the past.

If you are asking whether Signal convos are less private (from who?) on iPhones compared to what exactly?, then I'd say that the Signal app itself is as good as on e.g. some Android flavour but that it of course depends (like any other app) on the OS playing ball. _In theory_ the OS could happily screenshot everything. Not saying this happens on iOS but it'd be possible and unnoticable. For something actually resembling privacy on a smartphone you should be using GrapheneOS anyway.

3. Yes.

4. Define "safe". Anyone knowing your username can message you. However, you can easily rotate your username without losing existing chats/contacts initiated with your old username.

5. No.

Remember: I'm just a random dude on the internet. Signal has an ok blog/documentation which helps you verify my claims.

Replying to Avatar GrapheneOS

nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpquyj8kkqtcs20wj00t5drdwhqq8zfp0vhlsfnxuxgdr2ay7sd7vpsy2w96p nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqhxx76n82ags8jrduk0p3gqrfyqyaxnrlnynu9p5rt2vmwjq6ts3qf3easn nostr:nprofile1qy2hwumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnddaehgu3wwp6kyqpqmnwqngttz2xxpt8znsk565sl4q9mvtdere5mtp4l3622gel3e40segalsa No, that's not why. There are standard Camera and Microphone toggles which function differently than the Sensors Off toggle. There will be a separate one added by GrapheneOS for other sensors too but there's rarely ever a reason to grant the Sensors permission we add to user installed apps.

1. Zu Hause stehender selbst gehosteter kleiner Server &

2. FOSS Router mit openWRT (oder ähnlichem)

jew. aufsetzen und am Laufen halten

(beides mit normaler Consumer Internetverbindung)

Was ist falsch mit Android? Kennst du das auf AOSP basierende GrapheneOS (grapheneos.org)? Das ist der Goldstandard unter den Android OS, wenn es um Sicherheit und Privatsphäre geht.

Whether the GOS team will support faceunlock is hardware dependent. The Pixel 4a had proper and several cameras with I think infrared and and stuff that made it suitable for secure faceunlock. Later models don't have that which would make faceunlock not secure enough to meet the GOS team's bar. If new Pixels again have suitable hardware they'll support face unlock again. They explained it much better but it made a lot of sense to me.

Fingerprint unlock issues often arise when using screen protection (or ofc with hardware issues), not software related.

Replying to Avatar GrapheneOS

nostr:npub10p76mcwj8y3lkrsf4raxq3j43lq2l043363u4g3xs08dn4v56hasagmy3g Yes, and we've already been testing it via the Android 15 flags available in Android 14 QPR3. We already ported our changes to support those things previously. We have our Android 15 port largely done now.

Will Private Space eventually supersede user accounts? Is the degree of separation between data/apps comparable for Private Space and different users?

These details should tell you that if you consider these types of groups (sophisticated adversaries with limitless physical access) as a part of your threat model, then you should:

- Use the most recent phone you possibly can

- Upgrade your phone to the newest possible generation as soon as possible after release if you can help it.

- Use the latest version of GrapheneOS ASAP. Do not delay.

- Use a strong, high entropy passphrase to make bruteforcing the device credential impossible if secure element is ever exploited.

- Set GrapheneOS auto reboot time accordingly so encrypted data goes back at rest when the phone reboots, which makes AFU exploitation impossible. The lower the better.

- Enable duress password. Set it to something easy to trigger but not easy to misfire.

- Turn your phone off in a high risk situation, and trigger duress when in a duress situation.

- Disable your radios when not using them (turn off Wi-Fi, use airplane mode, disable NFC, UWB etc.) for attack surface reduction.

- Set an appropriate USB port control or disable the USB port so they aren't able to connect a device to it.

- Use user profiles (application data and user files within profiles are stored encrypted with separate credentials).

- Enable upcoming GrapheneOS security features like second factor authentication unlock when they come out.

- Communicate only over secure messaging. Some apps like Molly (Signal fork) have features to encrypt the app storage with a passphrase, which access to that app's data impossible even when a profile is compromised providing the passphrase is secure enough.

- Become disassociated to data. Learn to only keep files or other data as long as it is necessary. If you have no use for them for a long time, then back it up elsewhere, encrypted. Delete anything you don't have a use for in the present. Your data is not your memories.

- Remember that you are only as secure as the people you trust. If they do not meet your safety or security requirements, don't enable them to do things that could cause trouble.

nostr:nevent1qqs8uxurjncnpj8uyzqy5gd3lyevzd8u92xhk2xe9fdln5y03hgwrwgpz4mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wd68ytnzvuhsygxptfdxtxrw026pxn0w82u9y4x6t3w5kp883d83djpgxuvj6d23s5psgqqqqqqsgwaf3p

Is there a rough ETA for the second factor authentication? :)) Or a GitHub branch to follow to see development progress?