Thank you for sharing this. 🙏

Day 1 at Bitcoin Amsterdam!

I'll be on a panel on the main stage today (11:45), and tomorrow I'm doing a solo talk on the proof-of-work stage (10:00).

(If you're at the event and would like to purchase a signer kit p2p, hit me up -- I'm wearing the cap below. 🙂)

https://nostrcheck.me/media/public/nostrcheck.me_3836752470247633511697095596.webp

https://nostrcheck.me/media/public/nostrcheck.me_4301340572906396211697095640.webp

https://nostrcheck.me/media/public/nostrcheck.me_5617583066940150731697095721.webp

Herring

Already had what will surely be a highlight of my trip to Amsterdam -- so excited to set this up when I get back home. Thank you nostr:npub1k5f85zx0xdskyayqpfpc0zq6n7vwqjuuxugkayk72fgynp34cs3qfcvqg2 !!!

https://nostrcheck.me/media/public/nostrcheck.me_9967790630863109411697033907.webp

Hello Amsterdam. https://nostrcheck.me/media/public/nostrcheck.me_7944517825002745351697026138.webp

Yes, that's definitely your problem -- you have significant bridging that is likely causing the screen to not work and needs to be resolved. Removing some of the solder if you're able would probably be a good idea.

Did you do the soldering yourself or was the Pi pre-soldered?

This sounds exceptionally bad. 🤣

Always feels good to get 20+ SeedSigner kits through airport security.

👆

So cool to see others getting value from these. 🙂

nostr:note1lawr02n0f3udhy7gkegxq7jx0hayypygjsg969t8m3cj8dlk3vksv53y9n

Your an animal Doggy! Wait, I guess that goes without saying...

🧡

Need to experiment and attempt different registers one by one to confirm that none of them brick the Pi.

Before we added the ability to remove the microSD, it was also possible to store key material on the memory card if malicious software was in play. We’re thinking through if/how this should be addressed, possibly by creating a feature to permanently overwite user-accessible OTP registers. But its important to for people to understand this attack is only possible when a user runs a maliciously altered operating image.

Some additional thoughts: (1) if you run malicious software, malicious things can happen, which is why its so important to go through the recommended verification steps for any software that you use (2) this kind of attack requires an adversary to either deceive a user into running malicious code, or somehow know they are running malicious code, wait for the user access to keys, and then acquire the victim’s device to retrieve key material — a relatively high bar when other exploits (wrench attack, etc.) are easier to execute.

But as I said, we’re consdiering if/how to best mitigate this.

👀

note1u6pnvspsnru9du3mz2e63m0x7cn8t2rc56cqpuvzxwzjeauzztjqvkr7ac

It just so happens that nostr:npub1l5pxvjzhw77h86tu0sml2gxg8jpwxch7fsj6d05n7vuqpq75v34syk4q0n has resurrected the Orange Pill with this clever design!

https://v.nostr.build/MKgE.mov

nostr:note12vxtmcjle4ytqw9mdh7xw79dxvs580aya5kc0gpp747w8qmgc25s44fz7k

That’s a question for nostr:npub1tv8gmfhalwnxxquxjzeh6gtdsdz6vg7vx0s3rt7s7uuw6aujh32qn77wn2 …

There is in fact an updated version of the Orange Pill design where nostr:npub1l5pxvjzhw77h86tu0sml2gxg8jpwxch7fsj6d05n7vuqpq75v34syk4q0n has very cleverly implemented the ability to remove the MicroSD card… I don’t believe that design has been published yet but if you’re in the EU, he could probably help you get your hands on one. Or if you happen to be in the US I can help, just LMK. 🧡

🧡

Ah, my mistake, I missed that part. No, our UI is designed for that 240x240 screen that is implemented on the waveshare hat. There’s no terminal output that would allow you to interact with the software.