that's assuming a lot.
but you're correct that there's more CPU power in the hands of data centers and big corporations then there are among private citizens.
but saying that it's easier somehow for a 3rd party to decide to focus all that to attack the monero network,
but for some reason it's *harder for a 3rd party to attack known Bitcoin miners? (that are centralized and rely on cheap energy to survive)
its trade-offs.
personally I'm glad we have both.
Fwiw, this would make a person bullish on the new X9. Can you help me understand why the Monero community fought ASICs for so long?
I've heard that the X9 is barely more efficient than average off the shelf CPUs,
and LESS efficient than top of the line CPUs
we're still fighting ASICS unless there's been some changes I don't know about đ
The general idea is to keep hash power as decentralized as possible. to do that you need anybody and everybody mining, so using off the shelf hardware is the natural approach.
homeboy is right that large data centers with lots of compute make this less secure.
but that compute is already being used for economic purposes, I don't think anybody actually knows what the friction would be in getting lots of it on the Monero network for an attack.
We are almost there.
When (not if) governments attack the mining industry, node runners can use the ultimate layer of defense, changing the algo consensus forcing a new type of machine to mine new blocks.
This renders the attack as useless since their seized miners canât mine anymore.
So any attack becomes asymmetric in favor of the network.
While both Monero and Bitcoin can trigger this defense, it wonât work for Monero.
Why?
You can play this wargame in your head.
Federal government buys all Googleâs CPUs to attack Monero, after Monero node runners trigger the change the seized CPUs can go back to their usual business.
In Bitcoinâs case ASIXs canât be used for anything else, so they become expensive electrical waste.
you haven't thought it through.
what you're talking about is a hard fork.
for starters, good luck getting the node runners or ANY significant part of the Bitcoin network to follow a hard fork. any suggestion that there would be a fork would split the community and crash the price.
so either the attack would succeed because the fork didn't get any support or was irrelevant,
or the attack would fail because there was a fork.
either way the Bitcoin network gets fucked. which I assume is the point of attacking it. I don't think we can assume they're attacking because they want control of the network, maybe they just want it gone.
tldr, there is NOT asymmetrical risk in executing a mining attack.
BUT they dont have to do that and they probably wont.
they just have to write letters to mining companies and threaten them with regulatory burden until they comply.
otoh
there are no mining companies to write letters to on Monero. so the most likely source of mining pressure actually doesn't apply at all.
and if it comes to the nuclear option, monero has already forked twice to arrive at the current mining algo. theres absolutely no reason they can't do it again. AND the project is easier to come to consensus than Bitcoin.
it would still be traumatic for the community no doubt, but less so because they dont rely on institutions anyway.
the main difference is there isn't an ASIC industry ready to go.
this could be a legit problem, in the extremely unlikely scenario that you're talking about.
So are you telling me the solution is to save money in a network that can be attacked by a few Google datacenter?
you have no idea how many "data centers" and what it would take to bring those online to attack the network. You're just making it up.
so youre telling me it's better to save money in a network that can be attacked by letters from lawyers ?
Wtf are you talking about, Monero was successfully 51% attacked on August 2025.
that isn't true.
they didn't get 51% and Bitcoin is just as susceptible to this kind of attack as Monero is.
if someone makes a shitcoin and uses it to pay miners extra rewards to mine to their pool and then their pool does reorgs on the chain,
this is something ANYBODY can do at any time on any chain. it isn't unique to monero.
You're also not responding to the point that I made.
They mined blocks on the side then released the new branch forcing a block reorganization.
This is how double spending attacks are executed.
ok.
any large pool on any PoW chain could do this.
Thatâs why you need 6 blocks to consider a transaction as valid.
If they can keep the attack for long periods of time, they render your settlements useless.
You need those confirmations because PoW is probabilistic. Any entity with a large share of hashrate, even if it's less than 51%, can selfish mine and force block reorgs on any PoW coin. Their successful attempts increase the more hashrate they have, but it doesn't require anywhere even close to 51% to start disrupting the network.
Agree, the problem is for how long can the attacker sustain a âlongerâ branch.
1 hour of desync is accounted in the design, a full week is no bueno.
Then at 51% their branch will accumulate more PoW over long periods of time.
Exactly Qubic couldn't sustain it. Even during the attack you just had to wait for more confirmations.
My point was that for example Foundry alone could selfish mine Bitcoin already and it would be the same situation as Qubic and Monero. They have about as much hashrate as Qubic had at it's peak as with Monero. Just because they haven't done it yet doesn't mean they don't have the ability to. Incentives make it unlikely, but selfish mining inverts incentives. It's more of an economic attack.
several companies accepting Monero insisted on 15 confs during the attack.
it depends on the specifics of the attack I'm sure, but it seems like 6 conf on Bitcoin is excessive.
in the case of this specific attack, the transactions that were reorged out reverted to the mempool and settled later.
but the attacker *could try to double spend by spending, reorging and then broadcasting a conflicting transaction in hopes that it gets mined before the first.
monero doesn't have RBF.
but timing a transaction in hopes that your pool is going to get lucky with a reorg,
and then get lucky again with a rebroadcast transaction seems like a pretty poor bet.
and exactly what is this transaction for and how is the double spend not detected immediately...?
does not seem particularly useful. I think these kinds of attacks are mostly useful simply if you want to destroy confidence in the chain.
so in this particular case, I would say the attack was a failure.
6 conf on bitcoin is overkill
several companies accepting Monero insisted on 15 confs during the attack đŻ
it depends on the specifics of the attack I'm sure, but it seems like 6 conf on Bitcoin is excessive.
in the case of this specific attack, the transactions that were reorged out reverted to the mempool and settled later.
but the attacker *could try to double spend by spending a tx, reorging and then broadcasting a conflicting transaction in hopes that it gets mined before the first.
monero doesn't have RBF.
but timing a transaction in hopes that your pool is going to get lucky with a reorg,
and then get lucky again with a rebroadcast transaction seems like a pretty poor bet.
and exactly what is this transaction for and how is the double spend not detected immediately...? does not seem particularly useful.
I think these kinds of attacks are mostly useful simply if you want to destroy confidence in the chain.
so in this particular case, I would say the attack was a failure.
This attack was a demonstration performed by a âgood actorâ, they didnât intend to double spend.
You are right, these attacks resemble a DDOS , they are less dramatic than expected but they still destroy confidence in the resilience of the network.
If Monero ever becomes an important monetary system these attacks will be real and more common.
it was just a publicity stunt.
they didn't manage to destroy confidence.
it's just something that people interested in POW vulnerability should know about.
there's nothing about Monero that makes it more (or less) susceptible to this.
well
obviously it's easier to do on smaller POW networks
