The lack of a “secure element”. While coldcards implementation is so laughably better than ledger, it’s not a fair comparison (there’s just zero competition to CC in this respect), a stateless design has the advantage of no illusion to security. When you pull the power to a seedsigner, your seed isn’t stored on the device, thus falling back to your storage design’s native security assumptions (where/how you store your seed(s)).

Granted, the cost to attack a cold card’s stateful design is $250k+, so I’m really arguing about something out of scope for many.

However, the planned SS port to esp32 hardware further lowers the cost, adds optionality, and increases supply chain attack resilience (the argument is “what if someone hw hacks the suppliers”; search “supermicro bloomberg” for an example).

Seedsigner is not a cold storage solution, it’s a signing device. In your instance, the seedQR is one part of the storage solution. What medium it’s imprinted on, where you keep it, how you access it, and when it’s accessible are other components of that storage solution.