Damn. Bybit just released a report: the compromise was not Bybit, but on the open source wallet they were using from third-party servers. They hot swapped the Gnosis SAFE UI in production with JS code that ONLY targeted Bybit's cold wallet.
Security is hard.
It's not as hard as they make in the ETH ecosystem. Rule #1: Don't build on a foundation of sand.
This pretty much can happen with all Nostr web clients.
With native clients, they need to steal the signing key, but since that key must be on a computer to build the app, it's not impossible to steal it.
Point taken but nostr isn't financial software.
It is tho, but not at that scale. Protect your nsec
What if the malicious client sends an invisible DM to the attacker not only with your nsec but with also your Nostr Wallet Connect secret?
Since you are not verifying your zaps out, they can just slowly drain your funds forever.
Primal's reputation is worth more than the throwaway money in my Nostr wallet.
It's really just like banks. Eventually we'll circle back around to trusting institutions because it's just easier, and safer for the average person.
What if attackers have been stealing small amounts from you for the past year and you have not realized?
I don't use NWC. Too low friction. Bad security posture.
However, doesn't NWC have spend limits for this reason?
Yep, but if people don't check where each individual zap is going then who knows which wallet is actually receiving them. A malicious client can create a zap for A to receive but with B's address.
Thank you for all you do, Vitor 🙏 I'm hoping for a good open-source mobile nostr client with an ecash wallet built in. Don't mind manually maintaining the balance with a separate lightning wallet. #GrapheneOS user that prefers to minimize background app communication. Amethyst someday maybe?
Advanced persistent threat...
Explain a bit more if you can pls
The wallet that assembled the transaction is a web wallet. Months ago, the web wallet's host, Amazon S3, was breached and a single JavaScript file was slightly modified from the original source code, which is available for everybody to see. The modification changes the recipient ONLY when ByBit's cold wallet is being used.
ByBit then took the assembled version with the malicious code and signed with all their multisig cold signers without verifying that the receiving address has been changed to the attacker.
Not suspicious at all.
Scary stuff 😨. Protecting the entire Software supply chain is no longer just a bunch of buzzwords used by vendors, nor unrealistic stuff that "paranoid" devs like to talk about. It's now a real necessity.
Wow, ok thank you for that. Wild. Security is very hard. After the trucker protest I recognized how many attack vectors there are. Tbh as a relative laymen it’s apparent that even the OS we use themselves preclude ‘safety’ the best I have been able to come up with is coldcard airgapped and even then the risks are omnipresent when attempting to sign.
Link?
Thanks, wild!
nostr:nprofile1qqs9g69ua6m5ec6ukstnmnyewj7a4j0gjjn5hu75f7w23d64gczunmgpz4mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumt0wd68ytnsw43q4gnztg users unaffected.
As always :)
Sounds like an insider job
This is why I trust third-party code about as far as I can throw it. Bybit took a hit, but at least they’re owning it lessons learned the hard way.
The only real security (both, digital and physical) is when folks don't know you exist. Everything else can be breached if somebody really wants to.
which open source wallet were they using, on what 3rd party server?
