Avatar
LogicallyMinded
83d302b5c25ed43e5b75532fa6a6bda21c4b63e9f516826798f516fc4159b9c7
Crypto trader. Independent thinker diligently working to move the Overton window closer to the truth. Advocate for decentralized governance models and freedom tech. Banned from Twitter for denouncing the vax pass. Don’t follow if you can’t handle the truth! XMR: 88RzWHVvdifJHwf1nsfVBrLYm8D5hFUcWHMtPK8F3TkzLLe2rqHkfNAUBQ2dSU1tTQenfSoXtqnxSMNiCaMekZ6wUMWtgnB

👆@BitcoinStu It would be great if you could provide more details on the attack scenario you mentioned.

Of course, not all opcodes would enable attacks on the base layer and thank you for the advice but you haven’t answer my question regarding recursive covenants. So you have no problem with recursive covenants and what they can enable such as parasitic on-chain KYC?

Such a scenario would need to be evaluated more in depth with actual numbers of what a malicious miner could earn vs what it could loose but still it would require taking of the majority hash-power. But here, you also assume that if a new incentive is created only one miner would go after it which is not how it would work from a game theory perspective. Although, it may be a fair concern that’s one that requires more analysis to either be uphold or ruled out.

I actually think that #drivechains would exactly prevent “degeneracy” from happening on the main chain. It would isolate it to drivechains and anyone would be free to partake or not in it without messing up with the primary use case of the base layer which is as you said, transfer of value. Don’t you think it’s a safer option than adding a bunch of additional OP codes on the base layer?

I don’t disagree that it changes the incentives offered to miners but again it doesn’t compromise the security and integrity of the base layer because even if a miner participate in securing a #drivechain, he still has to secure the main chain.

Replying to Avatar BitcoinStu

Scenario:

Imagine a drivechain that has been implemented to enable a new feature on a Bitcoin sidechain, such as more complex smart contracts. This sidechain allows for more flexible and powerful programming capabilities compared to Bitcoin's main chain.

Issue:

In the drivechain model, the security and proper functioning of the sidechain rely heavily on Bitcoin miners, as they have the authority to validate and approve the transfer of bitcoins between the main chain and the sidechain. This creates a few potential problems:

Miner Centralization: If a small group of miners gains control over a significant portion of the mining power (which isn't uncommon in Bitcoin), they could potentially exert undue influence over the sidechain. This might include censoring transactions or manipulating the movement of funds between the main chain and the sidechain.

Misaligned Incentives: Miners are primarily incentivized by block rewards and transaction fees. If the sidechain does not offer sufficient financial rewards to the miners for their extra work and responsibility, they might neglect their duties related to the sidechain, leading to slow updates or lack of maintenance. Worse, they could accept bribes to act maliciously.

51% Attack Risk: In drivechains, the security of transferred assets relies on the honesty of miners. If more than 50% of the miners collude or are otherwise compromised, they could approve fraudulent transfers or enable the double-spending of bitcoins on the sidechain. This risk is exacerbated if the sidechain's operation is central to substantial financial activities but does not contribute significantly to miner revenue.

Consequence:

These vulnerabilities could lead to a loss of trust in the sidechain's security and, by extension, could damage the reputation of Bitcoin as a secure and decentralized currency. Users and businesses might lose funds, or the functionality promised by the sidechain might be undermined by the actions or negligence of miners.

Broader Impact:

The governance issues and potential for misuse of power could lead to regulatory scrutiny, further complicating the legal landscape for Bitcoin and potentially leading to restrictive measures that stifle innovation and the adoption of blockchain technology.

I know this argument and I don’t find it compelling. My initial point was that #covenants would mess up with the integrity of the base layer and that #drivechains wouldn’t. I maintain this view. The scenario that you outlined doesn’t show that the integrity of the base layer would be compromised. If you keep your #Bitcoin on the base layer you won’t by affected by whatever wrong thing could happen on a #drivechain.

In terms of impact, a drivechain is no different than wrapping your #BTC and sending them on another L1. Of course when doing so you’ll have to accept different security assumptions and it’s up to each of us to make this assessment.

When it comes to potential reputational damage followed by more regulations, these are second-order effects which can arise for a multitude of reasons and which are broadly out of control of the network. The strength of an unstoppable system like Bitcoin is that if it does what it’s supposed to do, it doesn’t have to worry about second-order effects as those wouldn’t directly impact the way it functions. I actually had the exact same concerns when researching drivechains (you can check out my previous posts if you want to verify) and came to the conclusions that I just discussed.

To sum it up I would say that what happens on the drivechain stays on the drivechain we can’t say the same about covenants which can profoundly change the nature of the base layer such as the emergence of parasitic on-chain KYC that would greatly impact the fungibility of your bitcoins even if you never interact with a covenant.

The #TornadoCash verdict by the Netherlands court basically says to programmers that they shouldn’t deploy code on a #blockchain. It’s impossible for anyone to foresee all the scenarios in which an #OpenSource tool may be used by criminals. Once deployed on a smart contract the tool is unstoppable. It’s like saying to manufacturers that they smwould be hold liable for the use made by criminals of their products because once in circulation they didn’t take proper action to recover their product from the hands of the criminals. This is an insane decision.

#Crypto #Ethereum #ETH nostr:note12l82q3dvj0rm528ukyfqzauzv0ytsdfu9a9kkk2kv6kp9rqyhkkslktlly

I disagree that #Bitcoin is good enough and it’s time for it to ossify but I also disagree that we should add more OP codes such as OP_CAT and OP_CTV that would compromise the integrity of the base by for instance enabling the implementation of parasitic on-chain KYC. A good compromise seems to be #drivechains that would allow for more experimentations in the area of scaling and #privacy without the parasitic nature that recursive #covenants would bring on the base layer.

#BTC #drivechain

Enforcing KYC check through a multisig provides less flexibility than through a #covenant. It’s true that no one can force you to generate a recursive covenant for your self-hosted #Bitcoin but any outputs that at any point in time will touch a regulated entity (exchange, ETF, corporation etc.) will be required to generate a recursive covenant enforcing KYC check to send the coins out. This means that the Bitcoin network will see an ever growing share of its supply being compliant with on-chain KYC. You can keep holding your non-KYC #BTC but these won’t be fungible with KYC addresses. The liquidity of your assets will decrease over time with the risk of seeing two exchange rates, one for KYCed bitcoins and one for non KYCed bitcoins. The only way your bitcoins will be usable is through a circular economy that is accepting non-KYC bitcoins.

This should not be a surprised to anyone. It’s called the #TravelRule. You can thank the #FATF for it.

#Bitcoin #Gemini #Crypto nostr:note1cwsegjaqz2pjr7zfhwzv8euwflde2227a92wflnlmqngxf7jl3mq04dt4c