So the solution is to leave your country? It seems like admitting defeat.
If this type of attack was common I would imagine that sooner or later we would hear complaints from the merchants who got scammed. Also, I’m not sure what this attack would really achieve for a state actor. Distrust in the network? I think it would be easier for them to bribe merchants claiming to be scammed to support a disinformation campaign. I think your point that we wouldn’t discover the attack as fast as on Bitcoin is valid but I don’t think it would remain undetected forever.
Max supply is a meme but in practice it is irrelevant. #Bitcoin supply is elastic so it doesn’t matter whether or not there will be a finite amount of whole BTC being emitted. Here is what matters:
- Predictability of the rate and volume of the coin emission
- To whom the emission is being distributed
- Decentralization of coin ownership
👆 nostr:npub1uavkq2z6vqczd772ple0p0k44ncjcxv5lg4sq6r069aagvra47uq2dx9cn It would be great if you could provide more details on the attack scenario you mentioned.
👆@BitcoinStu It would be great if you could provide more details on the attack scenario you mentioned.
nostr:npub1w72nkwnrhncuwjxmmmh3px74dhjgcv8de5nayzfygrp6mj33e96sumwyhg I’m curious if you have heard of this concern and if it had been addressed regarding #sidechains.
Multisigs aren’t as flexible to enforce on-KYC that covenants would be.
Since you seem to have studied #Bitcoin a lot more than me, maybe you can point me to a resource that goes in depth with the particular risk that you’re describing. I haven’t seen any such analysis but if it’s such a concern, I’m sure the critics have posted a write-up on it.
Of course, not all opcodes would enable attacks on the base layer and thank you for the advice but you haven’t answer my question regarding recursive covenants. So you have no problem with recursive covenants and what they can enable such as parasitic on-chain KYC?
Such a scenario would need to be evaluated more in depth with actual numbers of what a malicious miner could earn vs what it could loose but still it would require taking of the majority hash-power. But here, you also assume that if a new incentive is created only one miner would go after it which is not how it would work from a game theory perspective. Although, it may be a fair concern that’s one that requires more analysis to either be uphold or ruled out.
That wouldn’t change the security assumptions on the base layer. Of course if you break this assumption, all sort of attacks are possible.
I actually think that #drivechains would exactly prevent “degeneracy” from happening on the main chain. It would isolate it to drivechains and anyone would be free to partake or not in it without messing up with the primary use case of the base layer which is as you said, transfer of value. Don’t you think it’s a safer option than adding a bunch of additional OP codes on the base layer?
How is this a bad thing? It seems it would help securing the base chase over the long run.
I don’t disagree that it changes the incentives offered to miners but again it doesn’t compromise the security and integrity of the base layer because even if a miner participate in securing a #drivechain, he still has to secure the main chain.
I know this argument and I don’t find it compelling. My initial point was that #covenants would mess up with the integrity of the base layer and that #drivechains wouldn’t. I maintain this view. The scenario that you outlined doesn’t show that the integrity of the base layer would be compromised. If you keep your #Bitcoin on the base layer you won’t by affected by whatever wrong thing could happen on a #drivechain.
In terms of impact, a drivechain is no different than wrapping your #BTC and sending them on another L1. Of course when doing so you’ll have to accept different security assumptions and it’s up to each of us to make this assessment.
When it comes to potential reputational damage followed by more regulations, these are second-order effects which can arise for a multitude of reasons and which are broadly out of control of the network. The strength of an unstoppable system like Bitcoin is that if it does what it’s supposed to do, it doesn’t have to worry about second-order effects as those wouldn’t directly impact the way it functions. I actually had the exact same concerns when researching drivechains (you can check out my previous posts if you want to verify) and came to the conclusions that I just discussed.
To sum it up I would say that what happens on the drivechain stays on the drivechain we can’t say the same about covenants which can profoundly change the nature of the base layer such as the emergence of parasitic on-chain KYC that would greatly impact the fungibility of your bitcoins even if you never interact with a covenant.
I haven’t seen any compelling arguments against #drivechains. You say that #drivechain would compel miners to do things that are not in the interest of the network. Can you give me one example of a “thing”?
We got to thank the #FATF for these. An organization of unelected people that coerce governments into passing their guidelines as regulations.
I doubt that feeless DAG design are really secured. For instance, #IOTA had failed to make any significant progress on to their vision years after the launch. If there was a similar model out there that works they probably would have replicated it by then.
The #TornadoCash verdict by the Netherlands court basically says to programmers that they shouldn’t deploy code on a #blockchain. It’s impossible for anyone to foresee all the scenarios in which an #OpenSource tool may be used by criminals. Once deployed on a smart contract the tool is unstoppable. It’s like saying to manufacturers that they smwould be hold liable for the use made by criminals of their products because once in circulation they didn’t take proper action to recover their product from the hands of the criminals. This is an insane decision.
#Crypto #Ethereum #ETH nostr:note12l82q3dvj0rm528ukyfqzauzv0ytsdfu9a9kkk2kv6kp9rqyhkkslktlly
I disagree that #Bitcoin is good enough and it’s time for it to ossify but I also disagree that we should add more OP codes such as OP_CAT and OP_CTV that would compromise the integrity of the base by for instance enabling the implementation of parasitic on-chain KYC. A good compromise seems to be #drivechains that would allow for more experimentations in the area of scaling and #privacy without the parasitic nature that recursive #covenants would bring on the base layer.
#BTC #drivechain