I don't claim the common good exists in a foundationalist way. I am arguing that conception of it, is necessary for a stable society. You're the one that's insisting that any ethical foundation must be derived from purportedly self-evident truths or objective truths about individual rights. I make no such claim. Either about individual rights or collective rights.

This might be the dumbest thing I've read all day, to be honest.

I sense you are a fan of Rothbard, et al. -- who, quite frankly I have almost nothing good to say about.

How am I suffering from an ontological fallacy, exactly? I'm not the one insisting that the normative grounding of my ethics needs to be erased in any universalist natural rights theory. You're doing that. Not me.

It's just as "real" as any social construct. Like language. Which is once again, why I think you're engaged in a kind of ontological fallacy.

I think you're engaged in a kind of ontological fallacy here, where you insist there's something necessary to directionality. The collective interest and the individual interest can simply be in tension, and mediate each other. Insisting on a simplistic grounding, as say praxeology tries to do, to me, is just weird. It just rejects any kind of dynamical notion around competing equities, and demands a universal starting point.

I definitely don't think that ought can be derived from is. I am firmly in Hume's camp.

I am advancing my own category of what I call the “fascist impulse”, yes.

For me, fascism is better understood as an impulse in people to wield permanent political and economic power, by capitalizing on cynicism of polities, and using cultural control (propaganda) and pseudo-religious mythos to contain the political conservation in a cultural envelope, that leads to extreme depoliticization of the average member of the polity.

I think this more intellectually robust characterization of fascism was always staring political science in the face, if you just came at it from a little category theory, and some analytical moral epistemology.

You have the play the political game and push for reform. I don’t know what else to say. Just throwing up your hands and excising yourself is exactly the kind of depoliticization that fascists pray on.

Kind of. And I think unconstrained libertarianism, particularly propertarian forms of libertarians are just outright fascist. See: Hans Hermann-Hoppe.

Sure, I am trying to tighten up the category of what I think a fascist is. Guilty as charged.

I just think when you think about fascism as an impulse or a tendency and ground it in things like a the desire for strong leadership, the fear of social chaos and disorder, the resentment of perceived enemies and outsiders, and the longing for a sense of national or ethnic identity and purpose, you can kind of make sense of the apparent contradictions in someone like Gabbard, Trump or Bannon.

Basically all intellectualism boils down to just trying to formulate better categories, ultimately.

In other words, I’m trying to set aside the idealistic frame in which most political science tries to operate and say: guys, we’ve learned a lot of about human nature and how it operates in political economies, so there might be a more useful framing for understanding the apparent ideological contradictions we see … which are only contradictions in the idealist notions of these ideologies. But not contradictions at all, if reduced to core tendencies.

What I think is when you do this simple reframing, you can see the fascist golem for what it is. I actually think we try hard not to see it, and make bad mistakes trying to categorize it, because a synthesis like this has better explanatory power, in my view.

In conclusion, to me, fascism is better understood as an impulse in people to wield permanent political and economic power, by capitalizing on cynicism of polities, and using cultural control (propaganda) and pseudo-religious mythos to contain the political conservation in a cultural envelope, that leads to extreme depoliticization of the average member of the polity.

The key point is that when these principles are taken to an extreme and divorced from any consideration of the common good or the social and institutional prerequisites for a stable and just society, they can lead to outcomes that are deeply problematic and that can create the conditions for more authoritarian and even fascistic forms of politics to take root.

Here's how this dynamic might play out:

If the principle of "don't aggress" is interpreted in a highly individualistic and atomistic way, it can lead to a view of society as nothing more than a collection of isolated individuals, each pursuing their own interests without regard for others. This can erode social bonds, undermine a sense of shared responsibility, and create a vacuum of meaning and purpose that can be filled by more authoritarian and collectivist ideologies.

Similarly, an absolutist conception of private property rights, without any recognition of the broader social context in which those rights are embedded, can lead to extreme inequalities of wealth and power, and a sense of disenfranchisement and resentment among those who feel left behind. This can create fertile ground for populist and nationalist movements that promise to restore a sense of belonging and purpose, even at the cost of individual freedoms.

Moreover, if the state is seen as nothing more than a "night watchman" whose sole purpose is to protect individual rights and property, it may lack the capacity and legitimacy to address collective challenges and provide the public goods and services necessary for a healthy and stable society. This can lead to a breakdown of trust in public institutions and a further erosion of the social fabric, creating openings for more authoritarian forms of governance to fill the void.

To be clear, none of this is to suggest that the principles of individual rights, private property, and non-aggression are inherently fascistic or that they inevitably lead to authoritarianism. Rather, the point is that when these principles are taken to an extreme and abstracted from the broader social and political context in which they are necessarily embedded, they can have unintended and dangerous consequences.

This is why thinkers in the classical liberal tradition, and more recently those associated with "state capacity libertarianism" and "liberal nationalism," have emphasized the need to balance these principles with a strong conception of the common good and a recognition of the positive role that effective and accountable government can play in securing the conditions for individual freedom and social flourishing.

I think you’re mostly getting my idea. I think it’s also worth mentioning that in many ways, classical liberals like say Locke and Jefferson, were in their own ways, skeptical of libertarianism (even though they didn’t have a word for it) as a standalone ideological orientation, hence the fact they were social contract theorists — which by definition is trying to mediate individual rights against some conception of the common good.

I’d go further and suggest that the emergence of state capacity libertarian and liberal nationalist thought are both re-evaluations of these insights by a bunch of former libertarianism and neoliberals who have recognized this very danger and are now trying to cope with it, in a contemporaneous conversation.

I will try to respond with as much academic clarity as possible, to avoid any misunderstanding of exactly what I mean when I talk about uncontained libertarianism:

Libertarianism, while a vital force for individual freedom and resistance against tyranny, can become self-defeating and enable fascism when taken to an extreme and not constrained by a commitment to the common good. The libertarian focus on individual liberty and skepticism of collective action, when unmoored from any conception of public interest or social responsibility, can erode the very foundations of a free and open society.

By making epistemic arguments against the possibility or knowability of the common good, radical libertarianism can fuel a market fundamentalism that concentrates power in the hands of the wealthy, dismantles social protections, and undermines the capacity for democratic self-governance. This atomistic individualism creates a vacuum of meaning and solidarity that is easily exploited by fascist demagogues promising a return to unity and purpose through authoritarianism. Thus, an improperly contained libertarianism that rejects any notion of the public good or legitimate government can paradoxically enable a far greater threat to human freedom in the form of fascist tyranny. The libertarian impulse must be balanced with a commitment to the rule of law, democratic institutions, and some conception of our shared responsibilities and interests as a society.

Of course it has to be contained. The individual is not the only equity in a society. There must be a social interest considered, as a prerequisite to encouraging cooperation, rather than violence.

Yes! nostr:note1kcg8xevur0l9pesrmtr3vf5sahz4a4l64lvq8fqyevv5lrjq7v0s3hhae2

Oh, I would argue that praxeology is complete epistemic nonsense. And thus, anything that rests upon its axioms, is not truth-reifying by definition.

Liberal aristocracies can form, can be corrupt, and can run amok. But that doesn’t make them fascists. It’s why they’re haunted by their mistakes, and waste away painting dead soldiers. It’s not that it’s not a failure of liberalism. It’s just that, well, it maintained the pretense. That at least counted for something. These fascists … there’s no pretense.

None of these people served the fascists, actually. But Nixon was a cheap date, to be fair.

Close, but so slightly off, as to miss who the fascists actually are in this story.