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Xtr3m3hodl
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Is the only way a merchant can verify the token hasn't been previously spent is to convert to lightning?

This is why I'm really grateful for apps like phoenixd. Not a real lightning node but kinda acts as as one without all the channel management burden. Basically a server lightning self custodial wallet. Looking to experiment further with it

It is amazing that #nostr works.

#asknostr devs that use compile time languages as the main language, do you always write the code twice? Currently converting a python codebase to rust and it seems like programming in rust is only valuable after the core of what needs to be built have been mapped out. It feels like a terrible language for exploration of ideas.

Is this the experience of others?

Replying to Avatar Trey

Bitcoin passphrase vs. multisig: Which is right for you?

Two approaches people often consider to gain additional bitcoin security are a passphrase (a one-word secret) and multisig (secures your bitcoin with multiple keys). Let’s see how these two approaches compare. 👇

Singlesig + passphrase

By adding a passphrase to your singlesig wallet, you add a 13th or 25th word of your choosing to your seed phrase, which generates a wholly separate and unique wallet from the default wallet generated without a passphrase. You can create an infinite number of passphrase wallets associated with a single seed phrase backup and hardware wallet.

A passphrase adds some protection in that it distributes your risk across three critical items (your device, seed phrase backup, and your passphrase), but it still has a major single point of failure. If your passphrase is ever lost or forgotten, your bitcoin are gone forever because you no longer have the key to the bitcoin wallet.

Multisig

Multisig is a bitcoin custody model where you construct a wallet using multiple bitcoin keys instead of just one. Multisig is very flexible, allowing wallet developers and even users to set the total number of keys used to construct the wallet (n) and the number of those keys required to spend (m). This creates what’s called an m-of-n quorum. There are practically infinite ways to approach multisig, but the most popular approaches are 2-of-3 (three keys total, with any two keys required to spend) and 3-of-5 (five keys total, with any three needed to spend).

Comparing passphrase with multisig: 7 points to consider

1⃣ Convenience - SS + passphrase is more convenient than DIY multisig but similar to collaborative custody multisig

2⃣ Ease of backup - It’s easier to back up a single hardware wallet, a seed phrase, and a passphrase than back up all the keys and seed phrases necessary to properly store your bitcoin in a standard multisig wallet.

3⃣ Availability - To understand the differences between passphrase and multisig for availability of access, you have to consider multiple possible scenarios: singlesig with and without properly secured passphrases, standard multisig, and collaborative custody multisig. Each of these has different availability of access profiles.

4⃣ Transaction costs - Mining fees in periods of low demand for block space are very cheap, leaving this category often irrelevant. However, it remains true that multisig transactions are more expensive than singlesig transactions. Using a passphrase with singlesig doesn’t add anything additional to the mining fee above standard singlesig; the mining fees are directly correlated with the number of keys involved in the transaction.

5⃣ Fault tolerance - Multisig shines against singlesig with a passphrase and singlesig in general when it comes to fault tolerance. That’s because the nature of multisig (and, again, proper key storage and seed phrase backups!) makes it very difficult to lose enough keys (and the necessary wallet configuration information) to lose access to your funds.

6⃣ Resisting attacks - Altogether, multisig has the slight upper hand for attack resistance. In 2-of-3, an attacker would have to physically compromise at least two physical locations without your knowledge and have specific knowledge that the discovered keys are used in multisig and compromise your multisig configuration information.

7⃣ Financial services - Collaborative custody multisig opens the door to financial services done in a trust-minimized way, such as collateralized loans (where three parties can share custody of funds so that all parties have transparency as to the state of the funds on the blockchain). It also uniquely solves for the problem of bitcoin inheritance.

Can you add a passphrase to multisig?

Yes, you can add passphrases to one or more of the keys used in your multisig m-of-n scheme. But should you? Most bitcoin users set up multisig wallets without passphrases because multisig already eliminates a given hardware wallet or seed phrase as a single point of failure. Adding passphrases can add unnecessary complexity, and unnecessary complexity diminishes security rather than improves it.

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Every decision you make regarding bitcoin custody involves trade-offs. Perhaps multisig helps you sleep better at night, but you might have to drive several hours to get to that second key if you want to benefit from geographically-distributed keys. Or maybe you have to wait for your collaborative custody partner to verify your identity to sign with their key.

Choosing between singlesig (with or without a passphrase) and multisig isn’t an A or B choice; the answer for you might even be both! Maybe you want to secure the more significant portion of your net worth in a multisig collaborative context for peace of mind while keeping smaller amounts for easy access available in a software wallet on your phone.

It’s all about looking at your situation and finding a balance of trade-offs that work best for you and your family or organization.

Check out the full post on the Unchained blog 👇

https://unchained.com/blog/bitcoin-singlesig-passphrase-vs-multisig/

There is nothing stopping anyone from using both. The beauty of Bitcoin.

Replying to Avatar Seth For Privacy

Summarizing my thoughts on ecash

For some reason this ecash trend seems to be gaining steam instead of going away, so I'll try my best to detail my thoughts on ecash into one post.

1. The incentives are broken

Ecash finds itself between a rock and a hard place. For users to trust the mint, they need to know that the people behind the mint are trustworthy. If the people running the mint reveal their identities (or even just nyms), they're a trivial target for regulators and law enforcement as it's clear a mint is an MSB.

If the people behind a mint don't reveal their identities or nyms, users of that mint are subject to trivial rug pulls with no recourse. Which do you prefer as a user? Mint operator rug pulls or government rug pulls?

If a mint had been targeted like Samourai Wallet was, instead of just a potential privacy loss, all users would have lost all of their Bitcoin.

2. Ecash is not "self-custodial"

For some reason this concept of ecash being "self-custodial" is a thing, merely because the tokens themselves are self-custodied (and require proper backups of seed phrases etc.) While the lines get a bit weird, it's important to separate two things:

1. The asset people want is Bitcoin, not ecash tokens.

2. The asset people give up custody on is Bitcoin.

The ecash tokens themselves are completely worthless IOUs without the Bitcoin behind them, so even if I can take custody of my ecash tokens, I have 100% given up custody of my sats to a third-party.

Because of this, talking about ecash as self-custodial is disingenuous -- no one wants empty IOUs, they want Bitcoin. When they use ecash they do not have custody of their Bitcoin.

3. Ecash still requires all of the hurdles of Bitcoin self-custody

The hardest hurdle for many people to adopting Bitcoin is the simple first step -- writing down 12 words and making sure not to lose them. With ecash you still have this single greatest barrier of entry as you must backup a seed phrase or secret in order to restore your ecash tokens.

4. There is no incentive for custodians to implement ecash

While a custodian could switch to ecash out of the goodness of their heart, the incentives are broken for custodians. Not only does ecash harm the UX their users are used to (not having to store a secret seed phrase), it also introduces additional infrastructure complexity. Instead of just running a database, now they have to run additional mint software to provide their users with tokens, and handle support cases where users lose their tokens.

In theory a custodian could just also store the seed phrase for their users, but then have we actually improved on custodians at all? They even have custody of the ecash tokens in that case.

5. Custody is a line that cannot be crossed

The core of what makes Bitcoin unique is that we can actually take custody of it ourselves, gaining immense freedom and self-sovereignty through a bit of personal responsibility. Even though I am a massive proponent of building better privacy tools, sacrificing custody to get better privacy is a non-option for me.

Surely we can do better and build privacy tools on top of Bitcoin (or directly into Bitcoin's consensus layer) that allow us to have both privacy and self-sovereignty via self-custody.

I will not give up custody of my Bitcoin, no matter what, and you shouldn't either. "Better custodians" are just custodians with extra steps, and still strip us of self-sovereignty and thus freedom.

6. Time is a more scarce resource than even Bitcoin

Even though I have been very outspoken on what I view as a pointless venture, I am not here to stop anyone from building what they enjoy in the space. Devs working on ecash are free to do so as of course I have no control over them, though I fear that time spent on improving custodians is time that we will not get back. It's clear that the US gov and many in the EU are seeking to ramp up their attacks on Bitcoin privacy and self-custody, and our time to build tools to route around them is growing shorter and shorter.

P.S. - None of what I write is a direct attack on any ecash dev, and I have immense respect and personal relationships with most of the people working on this stuff. Respect for an individual doesn't have to mean I agree with them on every avenue they pursue.

The vast majority of people don't necessarily care about the real asset. If they did, usdt won't be as popular as it is today. So point 1 is kinda moot.

Seems a uniting factor between bitcoiners and the broader crypto community is the release of Ross Ulbricht

Running a relay on an android device is insane. #nostr ftw 🙌

Peach p2p is surprisingly really user friendly.