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Cyber Seagull
77953b3a63bcf1c748dbdeef109bd56de48c30edcd27d2092440c3adca31c975
Tiramisu. God. Bitcoin. Drivechain. In that order.

Are you a chat bot ?

Drive chain contributes tonlomg term stability by reducing the changes to bitcoin core. If we want to try new things they can be done on a L2 side chain instead. The exact opposite of your claim.

As if VC money isn't funding the opposition. Liquid among other projects have a lot to lose.

https://www.drivechain.info/

This has everything. All the pros and cons over years. Cons are midway through the page btw.

Replying to Avatar Guy Swann

One of us is misunderstanding the ā€œattack all DCs at onceā€ issue and it addresses multiple of your points either way.

When I say attack multiple drive chains, I’m not talking about attacking them within the drivechain rules, I’m talking about attacking the hash rate escrow. In that since they don’t care what the rules of the DC are. They are simply replacing the ā€œvalidā€ DC peg out with an invalid one, and ACKing it instead. But because there are blind merge mined, what stopping them from doing this on every side chain at once? They can apply their hash power to all of the escrow transactions simultaneously, and send the DC ecosystem into a scramble to do full validation of everything to know the ā€œhonestā€ from the ā€œmaliciousā€ peg out. If they don’t, then there’s no way to know the truth. In other words, just like some of the coin pool proposals require a mass exit of all transactions to L1 to enforce security in the case of an attacker, then it seems that this trade off for DCs is to require a mass validation of the whole ecosystem by miners in order to ACK for the honest transaction.

Which means to me, that in many ways it has the same centralization concerns as bigger blocks. While a negative externality is that it has the potential to change the mining profitability dynamic on L1. And we don’t necessarily know how either.

I just think serious skepticism is warranted. I wish we could see it active with real value behind it and just test a large scale attack, like 70% of the hash power, to see how it plays out. Just having some testnet DCs isn’t giving us much there. I want to see the failure mode beaten to death.

Primary sources:

The difference between bip 300 and 301

https://drivechain.xyz/

DRIVECHAIN’S SECURITY

https://www.truthcoin.info/blog/drivechain/#drivechains-security

Why Drivechain Is Harder to Understand Than Previous Soft Forks: 3. NOVEL ā€œACCUMULATIONā€ OF SECURITY

https://www.drivechain.info/blog/hard-to-understand/

The main problem with drivechain is all the information about it is spread accross 5 or 6 different websites, and accross several years of tweets, and emails since 2016.

Replying to Avatar Guy Swann

One of us is misunderstanding the ā€œattack all DCs at onceā€ issue and it addresses multiple of your points either way.

When I say attack multiple drive chains, I’m not talking about attacking them within the drivechain rules, I’m talking about attacking the hash rate escrow. In that since they don’t care what the rules of the DC are. They are simply replacing the ā€œvalidā€ DC peg out with an invalid one, and ACKing it instead. But because there are blind merge mined, what stopping them from doing this on every side chain at once? They can apply their hash power to all of the escrow transactions simultaneously, and send the DC ecosystem into a scramble to do full validation of everything to know the ā€œhonestā€ from the ā€œmaliciousā€ peg out. If they don’t, then there’s no way to know the truth. In other words, just like some of the coin pool proposals require a mass exit of all transactions to L1 to enforce security in the case of an attacker, then it seems that this trade off for DCs is to require a mass validation of the whole ecosystem by miners in order to ACK for the honest transaction.

Which means to me, that in many ways it has the same centralization concerns as bigger blocks. While a negative externality is that it has the potential to change the mining profitability dynamic on L1. And we don’t necessarily know how either.

I just think serious skepticism is warranted. I wish we could see it active with real value behind it and just test a large scale attack, like 70% of the hash power, to see how it plays out. Just having some testnet DCs isn’t giving us much there. I want to see the failure mode beaten to death.

Also, the attack takes place in public for 3 to 6 months. So yes. DC is vulnerable to a 51% attack no one is noticing for 3 to 6 months. A lot more than DC is vulnerable to that level of coordination and ability to waste resources, and always has been.

Replying to Avatar Guy Swann

One of us is misunderstanding the ā€œattack all DCs at onceā€ issue and it addresses multiple of your points either way.

When I say attack multiple drive chains, I’m not talking about attacking them within the drivechain rules, I’m talking about attacking the hash rate escrow. In that since they don’t care what the rules of the DC are. They are simply replacing the ā€œvalidā€ DC peg out with an invalid one, and ACKing it instead. But because there are blind merge mined, what stopping them from doing this on every side chain at once? They can apply their hash power to all of the escrow transactions simultaneously, and send the DC ecosystem into a scramble to do full validation of everything to know the ā€œhonestā€ from the ā€œmaliciousā€ peg out. If they don’t, then there’s no way to know the truth. In other words, just like some of the coin pool proposals require a mass exit of all transactions to L1 to enforce security in the case of an attacker, then it seems that this trade off for DCs is to require a mass validation of the whole ecosystem by miners in order to ACK for the honest transaction.

Which means to me, that in many ways it has the same centralization concerns as bigger blocks. While a negative externality is that it has the potential to change the mining profitability dynamic on L1. And we don’t necessarily know how either.

I just think serious skepticism is warranted. I wish we could see it active with real value behind it and just test a large scale attack, like 70% of the hash power, to see how it plays out. Just having some testnet DCs isn’t giving us much there. I want to see the failure mode beaten to death.

Can you explain to me the difference between BMM, Blind Merged mining and Hash escrow ?

DC is a two part bitcoin improvement proposal. 300&301

300 came first, obviously, and 301 came later as an added bonus and logical extension.

In the above reply you are applying BMM and "securing the drive chain" to peg out, which i assume is what you mean by hash escrow. Which are not the same.

BMM does not need to be implemented by several types of technologies we might find on a sidechain. So if, out of 256 sideschains only 10 use POW and BMM, how are miners able to attacknall of them. I point this out again because if you think they still can there is a huge gap in understanding.

DC Peg outs are just like any other UTXO. Why don't miners "attack" any other UTXO. If they do or can, the bitcoin game theory or tech is broken and we have much bigger problems than adding one OP code to core.

It's called Discord. What do you expect ? Accord ?

My reply to nostr:npub1h8nk2346qezka5cpm8jjh3yl5j88pf4ly2ptu7s6uu55wcfqy0wq36rpev #bitcoin #drivechain #bip300 #bip301

Bitcoin Audible #760

This recap and response is based on just this episode, independent of previous or future episodes on the topic i have not listened to yet.

> Security model based on Miners vote

- It’s not, https://www.drivechain.info/blog/hard-to-understand/ number 3 : novel ā€œaccumulationā€ of security.

> Underlining security of the above is not better than just raising blocksize, from the context of onboarding people unto the drivechain.

- The wording here is a bit off, but if i understand what you mean, it is better because we get to each have Bitcoin do what we want on L2 while it stays the same on L1. More veriety of tomato sauces increases overall pasta adoption. Only having chunky tomato sauce, reduces onboarding.

> Each new sidechain is a new softfork

- How ? DC is proposing one softwork (or two if bip 301 is adopted later) not one for each sidechain. One softfork of bip300 enables several sidechains, not several softforks (Not more or not many more soft forks may ever be needed again actually)

> You lose L1 key authority over a certain amount of bitcoin and give it over to miners

- For a certain amount of time, Or as is more likely only in the way that when you buy gold with fiat, you give over control of the fiat to whomever sold you the gold. Further, nothing prevents Bitcoin like sovereignty of the tokens on the sidechain, or after selling the tokens sending them back into your custody, or after several months returning it to your original wallet and custody. Bip300 is called a Hash escrow for a reason. Being smart contract based it is far less custodial than alternative such as mints and liquid.

> Random anonymous injection of hashpower can reorder history on the drivechain.

-Or bitcoin itself. Why doesn’t it. Read the whitepaper.

> If the entire side/drive chain goes away, the user can’t recover their peg.

- You need to decribe how this would happen. I’m going to assume you mean the project closes and disappears. In that case you wait 3 months or exchange out with someone willing to wait the 3 months for you. Risk of a drivechain ā€œgoingā€ away should be in the users ability to decide after a cost benefit analysis.

> ~5 minute rant about being comfortable with a future base 1000$ fee for being a sovereign bitcoiner using other tools.

- Not an argument against DC especially if it can provide a market driven cheaper alternatives, your personal comfort with an arbitrary 1000$ or any other number is irrelevant to someone else’s choice and the market ability to deliver.

> I don’t think a bunch of different block chains all secured by the same miners that lose the ā€œyour keys, your coinsā€ property, where real ownership is determined by a vote by miners [is the solution], it just puts the problem in a different place.

- Adding more blockchains is just one usecase. We don’t expect many new entire blockchains. Many other projects may never need to do that to scale bitcoin or provide useful features, such as a lightning drivechain. Even if true, it should be up to the invisible hand of the market and not what you think.

> Early drivechain adoption would not have placed us in a different place than we are now.

- Somewhat agree but this is conjecture. By definition we would have been in an entirely different place, a place with long since activated DC. That place being better or worse is unprovable and worst, political. What we do know is that DC is not new, has been hardened by the fire of critique for many years, and has functioning software. Other solutions are perenially on the horizon of scaling bitcoin.

> Adoption of a new currency is not a technological problem it’s a mental shift, akin to adopting a new language.

- Great Quote

> The shitcoin wave was fuelled by people trying to recreate the resale price increase,ā€œtoken go upā€ of original Bitcoin. DC would have done nothing to mitigate that.

- We will never know. But the DC position is that the justifications for so many shitcoins would have been neutralizedand by things like a DC port, the way Ethereum has an EthDrive port, which you later admit is a valid use of DC...so....

> DriveChains do allow adoption of legitimate usecase technologies such as XMR.

- my personal favorite.

> Nothing at stake problem, malicious miner can Blind Merged Mine attack exit transactions for all sidechains at once.

- No. Not all sidechains will rely on BMM or even POW for their security, let alone asic compliant POW. So how will they attack all sidechains including POW chains. ? Also, mining is used to secure the sidechain through Bip 301. But it just akes it easier, it does not change the game theory or dynamics at lay. Bip 300 out pegging as you call it is a simple txn broadcast to the sidechains UTXO and withdrawal is a UTXO, just like anyother. I’m not sure why your mental picture of DC requires it to break bitcoin rules in some hard to understand way.

>...which means all of the honest miners need to validate all of the chains to keep them all safe. Which means we are just moving the validation problem to a different place.

- If true, this would still be a good thing as that other place is one layer up away from a slow ossified base you never have to leave but can leave if you want to enjoy new things. The current state is you must comply with the consensus of dozens of other people on past and future changes to bitcoin core, main chain. As it happens there is a cost to supporting dead or harmful projects, a cost to not having used your resources on more productive projects. Again not all chain projects will work in such a way that they need bip301 or constant validation.